August 1914 : An offer not - or to be rejected

[NoMommsen]

Britain was always concerned about the neutrality and integrity of Belgium.

So concerned, that in August 1870 two treaties were signed and ratified.
One with Prussia, threatening Prussia that Britain would join France IF Germany attacks/invades Belgium during its melee with France.
One with France, threatening France that Britain would join Prussia IF France attacks/invades Belgium during its melee with Prussia.


Now let's assume an old, often (ab)used POD :

Willy II gets his will at the 1.August 1914 and the Schlieffen- or ather Moltke-plan gets cancelled.
To - somehow - secure british not-participation in the comming war Bethmann-Hollweg remembers these treaties and calls the british ambassador Goschen :
"There must be a misunderstanding ..." he starts.
First he explains his former statements about Belgiums and France possible fate in such a war as ... personal thoughts about the unthinkable ventilated in a friendly and private manor to Sir Goschen and nothing of an official position of the German Empire. Ofc the German Empire will respect belgian neutrality and integrity ... as long as its not compromised by some other ... power (exactly the same the french told the british, btw).
And then :
Germany is even prepared to ensure belgian neutrality by signing treaties of its guarantee, backed by british force as in August 1870.



Now : what do you, the community think will be the reaction of Sir Grey, Asquith, the rest of the cabinet and - in its consequences - of Britain to such an offer ?

Will/can they reject it ?
Will/can they go with it ? (and push for it in Paris ?)
Will/can they ignore it ?



edit :
... forgot a little detail :
This time Germany would like to include Luxembourg as guaranteed in the second treaty of London (1867, as an ... addendum to the treaty of 1839).

 

[NoMommsen]

*bump*

 

[King Augeas]

Germany is even prepared to ensure belgian neutrality by signing treaties of its guarantee, backed by british force as in August 1870.



Now : what do you, the community think will be the reaction of Sir Grey, Asquith, the rest of the cabinet and - in its consequences - of Britain to such an offer ?

Will/can they reject it ?
Will/can they go with it ? (and push for it in Paris ?)
Will/can they ignore it ?

They will be very confused, because a treaty guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality already exists, and does not need to be duplicated.

 

[Mackus]

They will be very confused, because a treaty guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality already exists, and does not need to be duplicated.

Britain: "So, Germans, what you're ACTUALLY saying, is that if we don't do as told, you'll violate existing treaty?"

 

[Gudestein]

We are talking about s treaties between Belgium and Germany right? Would they not just say "splendid, go ahead. Everyone should guarantee Belgian indedependence".

 

[Emperor-of-New-Zealand]

Is the premise basically that the British assumed the Germans would take a route through Belgium, and the Germans are simply assuring the British that, no, they would not?

Edit: I think a smarter way to get Britain to at least stay out of the war would be to have the Germans demand, as OTL, that the Belgians allow their troops to cross without hindrance, and, in this case, for the Belgians to agree so long as their borders remain intact and their people remain unharried. France then assumes Belgian accesion into the Central Powers and invades to one-up Germany. It's highly unlikely, and even then I don't know if Britain would remain neutral; they might agree with the French that the Belgians gave up their own neutrality, and the goal of protecting the balance of power in Europe becomes more important.

 

[Mackus]

Is the premise basically that the British assumed the Germans would take a route through Belgium, and the Germans are simply assuring the British that, no, they would not?

Edit: I think a smarter way to get Britain to at least stay out of the war would be to have the Germans demand, as OTL, that the Belgians allow their troops to cross without hindrance, and, in this case, for the Belgians to agree so long as their borders remain intact and their people remain unharried. France then assumes Belgian accesion into the Central Powers and invades to one-up Germany. It's highly unlikely, and even then I don't know if Britain would remain neutral; they might agree with the French that the Belgians gave up their own neutrality, and the goal of protecting the balance of power in Europe becomes more important.

I think UK can plausibly claim, that Germans violate the treaty if they enter Belgium regardless of whether they have Belgian permission. The treaty required Belgium to remain neutral, so UK would have valid cause to go to war against both Germany and Belgium. Rather than go to war to "save plucky Belgium", they could go in to "punish perfidious Belgian treachery".

Article VII of the treaty.

Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV, shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States.

 

[Emperor-of-New-Zealand]

I think UK can plausibly claim, that Germans violate the treaty if they enter Belgium regardless of whether they have Belgian permission. The treaty required Belgium to remain neutral, so UK would have valid cause to go to war against both Germany and Belgium. Rather than go to war to "save plucky Belgium", they could go in to "punish perfidious Belgian treachery".

Article VII of the treaty.

That's basically what I said in the latter part of my post:

even then I don't know if Britain would remain neutral; they might agree with the French that the Belgians gave up their own neutrality, and the goal of protecting the balance of power in Europe becomes more important.

 

[NoMommsen]

They will be very confused, because a treaty guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality already exists, and does not need to be duplicated.

... as it did already in 1870.
Nevertheless the then PM of Britain Gladstone rendered it necessary to threat France as well as Germany with british entrance into war.

Only this time ITTL Germany asks Britain to make up such a treaty and threat and guarantee with military force for Belgium again.

Britain: "So, Germans, what you're ACTUALLY saying, is that if we don't do as told, you'll violate existing treaty?"

Pls read the whole OP.

We are talking about s treaties between Belgium and Germany right? Would they not just say "splendid, go ahead. Everyone should guarantee Belgian indedependence".

No, I am talking about a treaty and treaties between Britain, France and Germany. ... on the object of Belgium.
However, I'm quite sure Belgium would not object, if such a treaty might be signed.

Is the premise basically that the British assumed the Germans would take a route through Belgium, and the Germans are simply assuring the British that, no, they would not?

Edit: I think a smarter way to get Britain to at least stay out of the war would be to have the Germans demand, as OTL, that the Belgians allow their troops to cross without hindrance, and, in this case, for the Belgians to agree so long as their borders remain intact and their people remain unharried. France then assumes Belgian accesion into the Central Powers and invades to one-up Germany. It's highly unlikely, and even then I don't know if Britain would remain neutral; they might agree with the French that the Belgians gave up their own neutrality, and the goal of protecting the balance of power in Europe becomes more important.

Everybody expected Germany to violate Belgium and invade it en route to France. ... as well as it was expected to be done from Germany AND France in 1870.

Yout other proposal : never going to happen.
It was raison d'etre for Belgium to stay neutral.

 

[NoMommsen]

Perhaps some of my thoughts about this matter to explain some things :

• the treaties of August 1870 (despite the already existind 5-sided guarantee treaty of 1839 threatened France as well as germany, that Britain would wage war on whoever violates belgian integrity, may it be by teaming up with the other, may it be by using landforce, may it be by using the RN

What was gained 1870 was, that the war between the North-German Union (Prussia) and France stayed "localized".

The same would be gained ITTL.
With the additional plus for Germany, that is going for the "Eastern solution", that France is now threatened with the RN making war on them, if they enter Belgium ... or Kuxembourg.
With the plus for Germany, that a still possible war with France is "localized" to Lorrain d'Alsac territory, much better and easier with lesser troops defendable while the rest of the army churns on Russia.

However, question is :
How will the british political establishment react to such a ... "request" of Germany to - please - guarantee Belgium with the might of its military force.

 

[Emperor-of-New-Zealand]

Maybe a worse Fashoda Crisis that significantly cools Anglo-French relations would be enough for Britain to hesitate before joining a war on France's behalf. Whether or not this butterflies the First World War is another question, of course.

 

[NoMommsen]

Maybe a worse Fashoda Crisis that significantly cools Anglo-French relations would be enough for Britain to hesitate before joining a war on France's behalf. Whether or not this butterflies the First World War is another question, of course.

That would be a different POD, that the one stated in the OP with a damn lot of butterflys changing the situation I ask about.


Any more ideas on the british reaction to the in the OP stated ... offerings ?

 

[Glenn239]

Germany is even prepared to ensure belgian neutrality by signing treaties of its guarantee, backed by british force as in August 1870.



Now : what do you, the community think will be the reaction of Sir Grey, Asquith, the rest of the cabinet and - in its consequences - of Britain to such an offer ?

Will/can they reject it ?
Will/can they go with it ? (and push for it in Paris ?)
Will/can they ignore it ?

http://www.gwpda.org/gooch/446-475.htm


(35568) No. 448.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.
(No. 256.)
Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

Sir,
I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and, as I was authorised to tell him this, I gave him an aide-mémoire of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.
I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone....<snip>...


Grey could not be an ally of France and a potential enemy of France at the same time, so any deal on Belgium was automatically a non-starter, (the sop to British public opinion was a dodge, IMO).

 

[Mrstrategy]

Any timelines about British being allies of Germany in ww1?

 

[NoMommsen]

@Glenn239
Yes, that's a short version of the talk between Sir Grey and Lichnowsky at the afternoon 1.August, starting around 15:30.
Its content reached the german foreign ministry at 22:02 that night.

Sir Greys telegram to Goschen was crossed IOTL by the telegram of Willy to Georgie, which lead to Sir Grey called urgently to the Buckingham Palace at around 20:00, when he invented the OTL : "There must be a misundestanding".

However, ITTL Sir Gey will get even later that night the mentioned "offer" of the OP, which Lichnowsky will spread in London the next day/as early as possible.

I agree with you, that Sir Grey for himself would be pleased to ... ignore it at least.
But he wasn't alone and not free in his decisions.
And ITTL he would be even less free.

For some more info about Sir Greys behavior and "freedom of action" during 1.August you can find and dl an interesting paper here.

 

[cerebropetrologist]

Sir Grey

Because knighthoods originated before surnames, a knight is 'Sir + First Name' rather than 'Sir + Last Name': in this case, either 'Sir Edward' or 'Grey' rather than 'Sir Grey'. When he was ennobled in 1916, he became Lord Grey.

 

[Glenn239]

@Glenn239
Yes, that's a short version of the talk between Sir Grey and Lichnowsky at the afternoon 1.August, starting around 15:30.
Its content reached the german foreign ministry at 22:02 that night.

Sir Greys telegram to Goschen was crossed IOTL by the telegram of Willy to Georgie, which lead to Sir Grey called urgently to the Buckingham Palace at around 20:00, when he invented the OTL : "There must be a misundestanding".

There was no misunderstanding on Belgium - the British were asked the question and rejected the premise and the Germans understood this to be the case. Where the misunderstanding came in (Grey's term) was in a British neutrality offer made independently during the same day. Grey reported Lichnowsky's Belgium question to cabinet, (where the matter had already been decided), but not the discussion where the misunderstanding occurred.

 

[Glenn239]

NoMommsen

For some more info about Sir Greys behavior and "freedom of action" during 1.August you can find an interesting paper here….

Side note - the paper states that Buchanan's telegram informing of Russian mobilization was no.347, received at 5pm July 31st. This is not correct. no. 347 states that "it has been decided" which means the decision had not yet been implemented at the time of writing, (it had been executed about 24 hours previous). The Buchanan mobilization telegram is at that link, no. 410, received at 3pm on August 1st, (ie, almost 2 days late).

Anyways, your article states that the reason for Grey's 'misunderstanding' with Lichnowsky was Belgium,



But Grey, faced with the apparent realization of his worst fears of enforced neutrality, did not choose to make use of Lichnowsky's pledge, nor, for that matter, did he reveal that he had even talked with the German ambassador that morning. Why not? Belgium provides the only plausible answer.

And later -

The meeting with the king meant the end of Grey's hope of avoiding war by pressuring France into neutrality. He realized that once he had to reject openly the idea of Franco-German neutrality, he could no longer use it as a means to influence French diplomacy. Although Grey had failed to secure peace, Belgium's resolve to defend its neutrality allowed Grey to take some comfort.

So, at least for me, already Valone's argument is convoluted. Grey wants Anglo-Frech neutrality and Belgium is the "only plausible answer" for his failure to leverage cabinet discussions with Lichnowsky's comments, and later when the Kaiser himself telegrams acceptance what Grey is claimed to want, (Anglo-French neutrality) he discontinues the discussions. Doesn't make sense, and the reason it doesn't make sense is because, despite his claim, Valone did not look at all the "plausible" reasons for Grey's behaviour. He writes,

Winston Churchill gave further testimony that Grey's diplomacy changed after the kaiser's telegram.

So, now moving on from Valone's theory, did anything else happen on the afternoon and evening of 1 August 1914 that might account for Grey's about face? Yes, the mobilizations of the French and German armies and the German DOW on Russia. Grey's reason for baiting Lichnowsky is in no. 419 dispatched at 525pm on August 1st,



The war. I have definitely refused all overtures to give Germany any promise of neutrality, and shall not entertain any such suggestion unless it were on conditions that seemed real advantages for France.(1)
German Ambassador here seemed to think it not impossible, when I suggested it, that after mobilisation on western frontier French and German armies should remain, neither crossing the frontier as long as the other did not do so. I cannot say whether this would be consistent with French obligations under her alliance. If it were so consistent, I suppose French Government would not object to our engaging to be neutral as long as German army remained on frontier on the defensive.



This is the bones to the actual Grey proposal to Lichnowsky for "Anglo-French" neutrality. It appears Grey wants to get the Germans to agree to French mobilization. Grey must have thought the Germans were more desperate than they were or something, to have even bothered. So, when the French mobilize and the Germans ask for an actual guarantee of neutrality, Grey cuts bait.
Here's the elephant in the room - the reason that Grey did this backflip, I'd bet, is that it bothered him France would mobilize first. Mobilization meant war. While Grey would say differently, his actions seem to suggest he agreed with Moltke on that point.

 

[Richter von Manthofen]

To the bones - if Germany guarantees Belgiums neutrality this will problably delay British intervention for weeks or months - at best give Gremany the opportunity to receive some more goods and "save" a larger part of the trade fleet - which was quickly seized or interned OTL by the Entente (neutrals).

 

[Glenn239]

The British were setting up for a naval war at the minimum so it's quite possible they'd have simply taken into custody the German merchant ships trying to return to Germany from overseas. Not like after guaranteeing Belgium the Germans would be in any position to do anything about it, right?