December 31st, 1943
Italian campaign
La Spezia - A raid by the Marauder of the 322nd BG targets the railway station, but many bombs fall on the port, damaging the submarine Murena. Count Borghese's men are thus deprived of one of their two units equipped for the transport of ammunition but at the price of new victims among the civil population.
Balkan campaign
British strategy
Allied GQG (Athens) - Catholics and Anglicans (among others) celebrate the end of the year and the headquarters of the 18th AAG finally regains a form of calm. Even if the Orthodox will wait another two weeks, all non-essential personnel are on leave, regardless of their religion. A little flower granted by Bernard Montgomery after having martyred his personnel so much. A thin layer of snow covers Athens, the Parthenon and the eternity of Mediterranean beauty in a peaceful atmosphere.
The British general is in his office, for his last meeting of the year with his two deputies - he is planning to go to England very soon for a little rest with his family. After all, it is now almost certain that there will be no activity on the front until spring - all the more reason to go to London to make sure that 10 Downing Street will continue to support the Balkan front as it should. Facing him, Sylvestre Audet is also anxious to return to the land of France, in Marseille if not in Paris. The French officer is now 60 years old and will soon reach the age limit. He still hopes to have the opportunity to shine a little before retirement. On this very subject, he asks :
- How do you see the campaign of next spring, general?
Monty already has his plans, but he is still not sure of the means he will have. His objective is nonetheless clear.
- It's obvious, Audet old boy! Our target will be Vienna, via Varaždin and Lake Balaton! We are not going to go climbing in the mountains of Bosnia just to please our young friend Peter II!
Panagiotis Spiliotopoulos, worried about the possible wear and tear of the Greek forces in a campaign, intervenes: "It is an ambitious objective! Especially with the little forces we have.
- Do not worry, dear friend! Once we have bypassed Bosnia and Croatia from the east, we will be able to reach out to this brave Alexander, who will eventually go through Slovenia. From there, we will be able to go back up to Austria. I understand your concern, it is legitimate. However, the Greek forces will have to continue to contribute to the campaign, especially in mountainous terrain!
Audet has another concern: "So we will not go and wrest Croatia from the pro-Germans? I fear that General Brasic and Peter II demand it!
- This time, they will not be able to demand anything! We have all seen what their little folly cost us this month. I dare to believe that they will be inoculated for good.
- I'm not so sure, General. I'm getting disturbing reports from my liaison officers to the Yugoslavs about the current state of mind in the Royal Army. And I don't hide from you that I'm curious about what the King will say at noon.
- We shall see. But it is your part, Audet. After all, Serbia and France are privileged allies since 1915! I do not doubt that you will know how to calm the ardor of this young man, if necessary.
The somewhat tense smile that accompanies these words is eloquent. Obviously, Bernard Montgomery does not have the slightest desire to put his finger in a Balkan gear in which neither he nor England has anything to gain. France, a nation almost without an army in this theater of operations, will therefore have to try to calm the feverish outbreak of an almost century-old disease. "A vast program..." Sylvestre Audet murmurs as he takes his leave. It will be necessary that the government - and in particular Léon Blum, in whom Peter II seems to have some confidence - will have to get involved.
Croatian black souls
Croatian Government Palace (Zagreb) - For Ante Pavelic, no tensions or hidden message - at least on the surface. The Poglavnik invited his entire government, all his court, for a small cocktail party to celebrate what is after all the end of the second full year of the Independent State of Croatia. The ministers are all there, the glass in hand, listening religiously to their chief. This one, all smiles, exclaims:
"Dear friends, the next year will see the completion of our projects and the dawn of a new era for Croatia. With the help of our German allies, who will soon triumph over the Jewish capitalists as well as the Bolsheviks, and thanks to the efforts of our Ustashi who, at this very moment, continue to cleanse our lands of the scum which has infested them for too long, our people will finally take their rightful place in the New Europe. Let us rejoice now in the success of our enterprise! For I know that, as of tomorrow, you will all be at your posts working hard to realize the vision of Ante Starčević! Gentlemen, I invite you to raise your glasses! Spreman za domovinu!"
Ready for the Fatherland! The cry is taken up in chorus by the assembly. In its ranks, some however, cultivate some hesitations, which they hide carefully in the bottom of their souls. Impossible to know if Pavelic, when he promises a forthcoming triumph, wants to
It is impossible to know whether Pavelic, when he promises a forthcoming triumph, wants to exalt his troops, or whether he is just unaware of the realities. This gnawing doubt may well, however, to spread much more than the dreams of the Poglavnik during the coming months...
.........
Bosnia and Croatia - All over the land occupied by the Ustasha, Croatian soldiers gather to celebrate the New Year with revelry, alcohol and punitive expeditions. Of course, it is the Orthodox and Muslims who are the ones who pay the price - too bad for them, they had only to use the Gregorian calendar...
Ivan Brozovic's 1st Ustasha AC is now well established in Bosnia, his 1st Mountain Division and its 3rd ID holding Zavidovići and Bugojno solidly. As for the Black Legion, it is still in Dakovo, but has not been able to breathe as long as hoped. Indeed, as soon as possible, it will have to break camp in the direction of Zenica: direct order from Poglavnik!
Serbian anger
Belgrade - In the premises of Radio-Belgrade, King Peter II of Yugoslavia is about to give his first speech from the liberated capital. The Serbian sovereign has certainly gotten technical help from the British to do this... but he has stubbornly refused to offer London the first part of his speech (and not even to Marseille)! Which, obviously, does not leave some people worried! In short, only one thing seems certain: on this New Year's Eve, the very orthodox Peter II Karađorđević will not wish anyone a happy new year. But many listeners are nevertheless dreading the wishes he is going to make...
"Brothers and sisters of Yugoslavia, Serbs of all countries, my dear Slavs of the South!
We, Peter II, King of Yugoslavia by the Grace of God, address you on this blessed day from the holy city of Belgrade, liberated by the blood and sacrifice of thousands of Serbian patriots and allied soldiers, whom I cannot, unfortunately, name. However, among this crowd of valiant men, let us distinguish one of them, a true example of bravery for the future: the blessed Colonel Milutin Janković, who fell as a hero in Leskovac and whom we have just honored with the title of Knight of the Royal Order of St. Sava."
At these words, many British and French people cannot suppress a doubtful pout - is it reasonable to distinguish a man with such strong positions towards the Croats?
But they have not heard anything yet.
"Our blue, white and red flag is flying again on every facade, at every crossroads, on every door. This spectacle that delights our hearts will soon extend to the whole of Yugoslavia. From tomorrow, other brave men will be on the campaign to go to the rescue of those who still groan under the enemy's boot. Let them be reassured. Soon, they will no longer be alone.
For I tell you, my dear subjects, we are coming. We are coming, and my heart bleeds at the thought of what has been done to our Kingdom. It bleeds at the thought of what so many of our people have suffered in their flesh, like the sufferings inflicted on Our Lord.
We now know, and the world with us, what horrors were perpetrated against them!
And the whole world will witness the punishment of the criminals when the most severe, the most merciless sword of Justice will fall on their heads. For those who attempted the unthinkable, those who wanted to exterminate our entire people are well known. And they have banished themselves from the concert of Slavic nations, thus losing all right to our indulgence. We will not take the trouble to protest, because it is no longer time to protest. It is time to strike. This scurrilous people will soon see the anger of the heirs of George the Black*, animated by a just wrath which will be that of all the true Yugoslavs!
My dear Subjects, terrible days await us. But they will be days of Victory and Justice, which will crown the righteous with their laurels and condemn the felons to Hell. Long live Yugoslavia, Long live the Unity of the South Slavs and Glory be to God!"
As one can imagine, the speech will be appreciated differently by different listeners. The Croatian ministers and officials of the Yugoslav government, such as Juraj Krnjević are properly stunned in their Algerian exile by what they just heard! And if the Serbian nationalists are obviously delighted, it is not the same for the English and the French, dismayed, who are now wondering how to get out of the quagmire where the anger of Peter II plunges everyone! Fortunately, since Sylvestre Audet's report landed on Léon Blum's desk, measures have been envisaged - they only need to be implemented in the next few months.
The SS is not a lender
Kaposvár (Hungary) - Maximilian von Weichs' report has not even reached Berlin, the Reich authorities are already looking into the organization of his Army Group. Indeed, without taking the trouble to send reinforcements, the SS-Hauptamt informed the Heer of its intention to "give as soon as possible units placed at the disposal of Heeresgruppe E and integrated by the latter into the XV. GAK." In this case, it is the 7. SS-Gebirgs-Division Prinz Eugen (Artur Phleps), the 11. SS-Gebirgs-Division Handschar (Karl-Gustav Sauberzweig) and the 105. SS-StuG Abteilung - three units currently in Bosnia or Croatia.
These formations, once regrouped, should form the III. SS-Gebirg-Armee-Korps, entrusted to SS-Obergruppenführer Artur Phleps - the 7. SS-GD passing under the command of SS-Brigadeführer Karl Reichsritter von Oberkamp. This corps remains "at the disposal" of the 20. Gebirgs-Armee, but retains the possibility of operating independently within the framework of specific operations, in particular for the maintenance of law and order, upon the decision of the SS hierarchy.
The case of the 4 SS-Polizei-Panzergrenadier-Division (Friedrich-Wilhelm Bock) severely tested during the Belgrade uprising, is not mentioned. It is true that if this formation is in theory part of the reserves of HG E, it is only if the command of the Waffen-SS had no other mission to entrust to it.
Behind this unpleasant development for the XV. GAK, one obviously finds the work of the Reichsführer SS. Himmler thus took advantage of the rout of his rival von Ribbentrop in Belgrade to consolidate the independence of his weapon... and his hold on to the continuation of the operations.
Von Weichs is informed of this news (there was no question of asking his opinion!) at the foot of the plane that was to take him to Berlin. He looks contrite of one who has taken another affront. However, as he climbs into his Ju 52, he wonders whether there was not something to be gained from the ambitions of the SS in terms of reinforcements.
History's judgment
"The year 1943 ended in a deceptive calm, while the chaos of the Balkans was in full swing, to the great misfortune of all the protagonists. What to remember about this month of December, which had seen legions of collaborators fighting against their former German masters, while the Yugoslav forces of all obediences made a new demonstration of their impetuosity? Essentially, because of the lack of forces, both sides had resigned themselves to hiring militias, to achieve the same result: chaos. This lesson, dearly learned, was to leave its mark on both sides the two adversaries for the coming year 1944.
But let's start by taking stock of "Garden". On the strategic level, it was an undeniable success: Serbia was almost entirely free of German occupation. However, this performance was obviously much more related to the evolution of the situation on the Eastern Front than to the performance of the 18th AAG. And one question could not be avoided: at what cost had Serbia been liberated?
Alas, the answer was simple: at an exorbitant cost. The 1st Yugoslavian AC alone deplored 3,500 dead. For their part, the various British units had lost 1,500 men and nearly 2,500 wounded. In addition, 4,500 Belgrade insurgents had disappeared in the turmoil. As for the civilians, the picture was even more grim: in addition to the ten thousand victims of Bubanj, the repressive operations in the Morava Valley and Belgrade had cost the lives of about 15,000 people - all without even mentioning the "events" in Kosovo, on which Yugoslav history has long chosen to cast a discreet veil over. That is a total cost of 12,500 combatants and at least 25,000 civilians.
On the other side, the Axis forces had retreated in good order and had lost only 3,500 dead, wounded and prisoners. The tactical victory was therefore very clear: before leaving, the 1. Panzer Division had slammed the door on the Allied armies. The glorification of this episode by the royalist propaganda would not change anything.
We can almost speak of mystification when, every year, the Serbian government commemorates what it calls "the victory of the liberation of Belgrade".
The outcome of Garden, especially compared to the resounding success of Market, obviously triggered a long period of reflection in the allied staff. How to explain such a disproportion in the results, when the balance of power had changed so little? Once the influence of the weather - which had slowed down the fighting - was eliminated, the answer became obvious. The "Market-Garden" sequence suffered from a major incoherence, by claiming to link two offensives in quick succession under favorable conditions...but with a refueling break in the middle. This allowed the Axis forces to reorganize in full knowledge of the facts.
The logistics condemned from the start the second part of the operation to great difficulties. Consequently, it was illusory to imagine that it would be fully successful, especially in the winter period. Montgomery, although he significantly underestimated the German forces, seems to have been perfectly aware of this: having taken stock that the promised supplies would only arrive with an unbearable delay, he had forbidden any premature offensive towards Belgrade, pushing back Garden at the beginning of the spring 1944, probably as a prelude to his future actions towards Austria. Alas, the austere Briton could not stop the Yugoslavs, who were enraged by the events in their capital and went to crash headlong into a wall of Panzers.
Finally forced to follow their ardent allies, then to replace them past Leskovac, the British were certainly not going to risk their units and their reputation under the gaze of the Soviets. The snow completed this timid advance, while the Axis forces easily escaped having exchanged an untenable terrain for time, and not without first bleeding the Allied forces. In short, Garden was executed in a messy manner, in a total confusion and without any coordination. One can even say that it was frustration rather than reason.
To defend himself against this heavy toll, Montgomery had a very simple answer: the offensive had been forced upon him by outside parties who had contradicted his orders to stop, and he declined all responsibility for its conduct. In fact, it must be admitted that Garden did not go exactly as planned at the beginning! However, the British general shows a certain singular bad faith when he states, in his memoirs, that "the operation would surely have been successful if it had been launched on the date and according to the plan foreseen... and it would have gone better in any case [if he] had had the possibility of really taking command of it" - which he had however excluded from the outset! One can see here a form of embarrassment in the face of the terrible events that the resentment of the Serbs was going to provoke in Bosnia and for which no one wanted to assume the slightest responsibility.
Even more dishonestly, Winston Churchill himself dared to state that "Montgomery had planned an offensive towards Belgrade in order not to disappoint me as he had done in Bulgaria, with that sweet naivety that is the prerogative of true military" (sic). A presentation of things that is daring, to say the least, but which has the merit of showing the Prime Minister's responsibility for the excessively long logistical pause following Market and which should have led to the cancellation of Garden - in fact, Monty had certainly been naive to believe in the promises of a politician!
Benefiting from a relatively neutral point of view, Sylvestre Audet would write much later: "the operation was condemned to a relative failure under the action of two external uncontrollable but decisive forces: the influence of the insurgents and Partisans, which we always ignored, and the promises of Winston Churchill. In our opinion, this is the judgment that should be retained beyond the anathemas, polemics and other definitive sentences stemming from nationalist considerations."
Churchill was all the more convincing because he undoubtedly believed in his promises concerning the supply of the 18th AAG - his fault was understandable, and it was likely that he would try to absolve himself of it. On the other hand, with hindsight, it seems obvious that the coordination with the endogenous Yugoslav forces was and would probably always be lacking: indeed, the latter remained slaves to their own interests, and were therefore uncontrollable... and incorrigible. By arming the different groups in the region, the Allies had given them legitimacy and means - but they were not able to really direct their actions. Alas, it is even possible to extend this judgment to extend this judgment to Ilija Brasic's 1st Yugoslav Army Corps. And for the greatest misfortune of all, starting with themselves, these forces had decided not to collaborate for the Victory, but to settle with more or less discretion their century-old hatreds, thanks to the weapons supplied by London or Algiers.
In sum, seeking his way through the dark ship of the Balkans, Bernard Law Montgomery seemed to have lit his lantern in the holy beard... A lesson that the interested party was not likely to neglect: he declared in private, at the beginning of 1944: "In the future, I will carefully avoid bringing the least support to any partisan movement! It is now clear to me that the people of the Balkans are only thinking of going for each other's throats". A principle however almost impossible to respect: the 18th AAG had to take into account its environment and conciliate the militias, even if it no longer wished to collaborate with them. But to be accepted as an arbitrator, it is necessary to be neutral... which it was impossible to claim with, at its head, General Brasic's forces, most of them Serbian and with well-known preferences. In the absence of a true mediator respected by all, the dramas having nothing to do with the world conflict were not close to calming down, completing to splash the armies engaged in the Balkans which had become, well in spite of themselves, actors of the foreground.
However, and as a meager light at the end of the tunnel, the humanitarian considerations specific to this theater, and so consuming of time and means, could only get better. Certainly, masses of refugees were still fleeing the occupied regions, but the flow would soon dry up. In the future, the Allied armies would no longer have their maneuvers dictated by local emergencies...because of the lack of civilians to protect! Moreover, the forces of the 18th Allied Army Group were now entering enemy territory, with a presumed hostile population, that had to be treated as such, not as a rescue operation! On this last point, it is necessary to point out exceptions (more or less predictable and to which we will return) concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina and Hungary.
Having taken stock of the situation, let us now consider the state of the forces present in the Balkans on December 31st, 1943 and attempt to evaluate their possibilities.
As far as the Allies were concerned, the colossal effort of the last two months had led to a certain dispersion of units, which were now spread out over a 400-kilometer front, almost twice as long as before. The logistics of the 18th AAG were going to be even more complicated. All this in the middle of a country in ruins, subject to civil war and whose population was exsanguinated!
On the other side of the front, the situation of the Axis was not better. Still mistreated by the OKW who insisted on treating it as a less than secondary front, the unfortunate AG E has to "hold" Yugoslavia with a mixture of disparate and more or less damaged units. Moreover, because of the lack of reinforcements and under the pressure of the OKW, he had been forced to let the Ustashi go, which had immediately started a terrible chaos resulting from the confrontations between communists and religious fanatics of all sides. In total, and contrary to the hopes of some Germans, if the Reich was indeed going to benefit from now on from the full support of Pavelic's army, the latter would devote most of its time to repairing the disorders that it would cause itself, while claiming the means to do so. It is therefore not certain that the Heer derived any benefit from its alliance with the Ustasha, to the great despair of Maximilian von Weichs.
The two armies were thus to spend the winter looking at each other in the mirror, weakened, unable to resist a determined offensive...and unable to produce one. All this under the amused gaze of the Soviets, who saw their political opponents in Yugoslavia kill each other and could mock at leisure these so fragile Westerners. It seemed obvious to them that the Balkan campaign was going to lead to a political mosaic, on which it would be easy for them to put the hand after the victory on Germany.
Monty, often judged so timid at the time of the offensive, did not have however to blush of his record. On the contrary, in just over six months he had liberated Greece, Albania and all of eastern Yugoslavia, including its capital. But, all man of military art that he was, he seemed quite incapable of achieving a rapid and decisive victory that would give him control of the country and prevent it from disintegrating.
Fortunately for the "country of the Southern Slavs", a player already very known but still underestimated, was going to enter for good in the political arena and to know a rise to prominence: Josip Broz Tito". (Robert Stan Pratsky, op. cit.)
