Jutland Redux - A summer soltice shootout

0200 26 June 1916 - German deployment
So, after an absence of 18 months or more, I am back posting. Why I hear you ask? Well, I retired in June and am now a gentleman of leisure...and you can only play so much golf, after all. What have I been doing since June? Well, I have modified all my large timelines that I posted on Kindle, Rudolf will Reign, Consequences of an Errant Shell, the Australasian Kingdom, Leyte Gulf Redux and A Reluctant Fuhrer. Proof reading 2500 pages of text can take some time. Plus I have cleaned the house and published a book on the Post Office in Tasmania. And dealt with the usual drama of having children, albeit they are supposed to be adults.

So why I have I posted this when I already had a half commenced timeline? I wanted to make a fresh start, not only on this, but also on two other timelines, one a pre 1900 Australia one, another an Alien Space Bats scenario based on my Errant Shell World where Imperial Russia is still hanging around in 2020?

So, you ask, you intend to write three timelines at once. When I am rolling, which I hope to be now, I have always updated two timelines at once. Three is a bit more of a stretch, so we will see how I go. I don't have those other annoying distractions, such as clients, to take up my time, anymore, so it's virgin ground, so to speak.

Thanks to all those that have read my previous works and hopefully more will jump on board. Anyways, here we go.


0200, Jade estuary, German Empire, 22 June 1916

After the disappointing results of the 31st May, when two out of three ships of the 6th Division had grounded and subsequently fouled their condensers, the operation was cancelled and rescheduled until the 20th June, subsequently amended to the 22nd. It had allowed him to add ships to his order of battle, notably Koenig Albert and the newly completed Bayern, the latter manned by the transfer of the crew from the newly decommissioned old pre dreadnought Lothringen.

The plan was simple enough. It represented his basic strategy since he had taken over command of the High Seas Fleet in January 1916 from the perennially cautious Hugo von Pohl. Scheer was aware that he could not match the Grand Fleet for sheer numbers, even taking into consideration British naval deployments in the Mediterranean. With the Baltic activities of the Russians curtailed, Scheer had gathered as much of the High Seas Fleet as possible for the operation, in an attempt to draw forth and trap part of the Grand Fleet and destroy it comprehensively, namely David Beatty's battlecruiser force; hopefully the Harwich Force as well.

The unfortunate cancellation of the May operation due to two ships grounding and fouling their condensers meant the submarine forces available to lie off major British bases were not as they had been a month ago, but the plan was unchanged. Hipper had already sortied at 0030 with the 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups, consisting of five battle-cruisers, four light cruisers and 32 torpedo boats.

They were to bombard Sunderland and draw David Beatty's battle-cruiser force South from the Firth of Forth. Hipper would then to lead the battle-cruiser force back onto the guns of Scheer's High Seas Fleet, waiting 45-50 miles off Flanborough Head. He had originally counted on Zeppelin intelligence; however, June 1916 had been a month of extremely poor summer weather, with a maximum four days running at 8 degrees Celsius in Hamburg. Forecast for the day was modest, with gusting winds, all of which would hamper zeppelin operations.

The last month had not been a kind one for the Central Powers, Russia destroying Austro-Hungary's armies in Galicia and the Ottomans also in retreat in the East. A victory was badly needed. For that reason alone, Scheer had pulled together as much fighting power as possible. After Hipper drew the British scouting forces South, they would be confronted with 18 dreadnoughts, seven pre dreadnoughts, an armoured cruiser, 13 light cruisers and 49 torpedo boats.

This had been the original plan, however, with zeppelin reconnaissance not a possibility, Scheer had amended it to encompass Hipper's forces converging on the Skagerrak, engaging and destroying any commerce and Royal Navy patrols that frequented the area. He was hopeful this would lure part of the British fleet out to drive his forces away. The High Seas Fleet could then overwhelm this under gunned force in waters much closer to home, their flanks covered by light forces and their relatively short path to retreat assured. In all total forces were:
1. Battlecruiser force, Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper

I Scouting Group
Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper, 1. Admiralstabsoffizier Korvettenkapitän Erich Raeder
SMS Lützow, flag, Vizeadmiral Franz von Hipper, Kapitän zur See Harder
SMS Derflinger, Kapitän zur See Hartog
SMS Seydlitz, Kapitän zur See von Egidy
SMS Moltke, Kapitän zur See Harpf
SMS von der Tann, Kapitän zur See Zenker

IXth Flotilla
V 28, Kapitänleutnant Lenßen hoisting Korvettenkapitän Goehle (Flottila-Leader) - screening 1SG
IXth Flotilla, 17th Half Flotilla, V27, V28, V26, S36, S51, S52

IXth Flotilla, 18th Half Flotilla
V30, Oberleutnant zur See Ernst Wolf hoisting Korvettenkapitän Werner Tillessen (flag), S34, S33, V29, S35, V30

II Scouting Group
Konteradmiral F. Boedicker
SMS Frankfurt, Kapitän zur See Thilo von Trotha hoisting Konteradmiral F. Boedicker (flag)
SMS Pillau, Fregattenkapitän Konrad Mommsen
SMS Elbing, Fregattenkapitän Madlung
SMS Wiesbaden, Fregattenkapitän Reiß

IInd Flotilla
B98, Kapitänleutnant Theodor Hengstenberg hoisting Fregattenkapitän Schuur (flag)
IInd Flotilla, 3rd Half Flotilla
Korvettenkapitän Boest (flag) on B 98, B98, G101, G102, B112, B97, S49, V43

IInd Flotilla, 4th Half Flotilla
Korvettenkapitän Dithmar (flag) on B 109, B109, B110, B111, G103, G104

VIth Flotilla
G41 Kapitänleutnant Hermann Boehm hoisting Korvettenkapitän Max Schultz (flag)
VIth Flotilla, 11th Half Flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Rümann on G 41, G41, V44, G87, G86

VIth Flotilla, 12th Half Flotilla
V69, Kapitänleutnant Stecher hoisting Kapitänleutnant Lahs (flag), V69, V45, V46, S50, G37

2. High Seas Fleet, Main Body
Chef der Hochseestreitkräfte:Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer
Chef des Stabes: Kapitän zur See Adolf von Trotha
Chef der Operationsabteilung: Kapitän zur See von Levezow

IIIrd Squadron, 5th Division
Konteradmiral Paul Behncke, 1. Admiralstabsoffizier Korvettenkapitän Freiherr von Sagern
SMS König flag, Kapitän zur See Brüninghaus
SMS Grosser Kurfürst, Kapitän zur See Goette
SMS Markgraf, Kapitän zur See Seiferling
SMS Kronprinz, Kapitän zur See Konstanz Feldt

IIIrd Squadron, 6th Division
Konteradmiral H. Nordmann (2nd Admiral of IIIrd Squadron)
SMS Kaiser, flag, Konteradmiral H. Nordmann, Kapitän zur See Freiherr von Keyserlingk
SMS Prinzregent Luitpold, Kapitän zur See Heuser
SMS Koenig Albert, Kapitän zur See Gaskell
SMS Kaiserin, Kapitän zur See Sievers
SMS Friedrich der Große, Kapitän zur See Theodor Fuchs

Flottenflaggschiff: SMS Bayern, Kapitän zur See Max Hahn(not in squadron or divisional organisation)

Ist Squadron, 1st Division
Vizeadmiral E. Schmidt, 1. Admiralstabsoffizier Korvettenkapitän Wolfgang Wegener
SMS Ostfriesland flag, Vizeadmiral Schmidt, Kapitän zur See von Natzmer
SMS Thüringen, Kapitän zur See Hans Küsel
SMS Helgoland, Kapitän zur See von Kamecke
SMS Oldenburg, Kapitän zur See Höpfner

Ist Squadron, 2nd Division
Konteradmiral W. Engelhart (2nd Admiral of Ist Squadron)
SMS Posen, flag, Konteradmiral Engelhart, Kapitän zur See Richard Lange
SMS Rheinland, Kapitän zur See Rohardt
SMS Nassau, Kapitän zur See von Schlee
SMS Westfalen, Kapitän zur See Redlich

Vth Scouting Group
Kommodore L. von Reuter, Admiralstabsoffizier Korvettenkapitän Heinrich Weber
SMS Stettin, Fregattenkapitän Friedrich Rebensburg
SMS Stuttgart, Fregattenkapitän Hagedorn
SMS Graudenz, Fregattenkapitän von Steiglitz
SMS Straslund, Fregattenkapitän Boller
SMS Brummer, Fregattenkapitän Drygala

IInd Squadron
Konteradmiral F. Mauve
IInd Squadron, 3rd Division
Konteradmiral Mauve, 1. Admiralstabsoffizier Korvettenkapitän Kahlert
SMS Deutschland, flag, Konteradmiral Mauve, Kapitän zur See Meurer
SMS Pommern, Kapitän zur See Bölken
SMS Pruessen, Kapitän zur See Lammers
SMS Schlesien, Kapitän zur See Fr. Behncke

IInd Squadron, IVth Division
Konteradmiral Freiherr F. von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels (2nd Admiral of IInd Squadron)
SMS Schleswig-Holstein, Kapitän zur See Barrentrapp
SMS Hessen, Kapitän zur See Bartels
SMS Hannover, flag, Konteradmiral Baron von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels, Kapitän zur See Wilhelm Heine
SMS Roon, Kapitän zur See Wilhelm von Karpf

IVth Scouting Group
SMS München, Korvettenkapitän Oscar Böcker
SMS Frauenlob, Fregattenkapitän Georg Hoffman
SMS Berlin, Fregattenkapitän Hahn
SMS Lubeck, Fregattenkapitän Priilowitz
SMS Danzig, Fregattenkapitän Wagner

Attached IVth Scouting Group
SMS Hamburg, Kapitän zur SeeBauer, Leader of Submarines

1st Leader of Destroyers
Kommodore A. Michelsen, Admiralstabsoffizier Korvettenkapitän Junkermann
SMS Rostock, Kommodore A. Michelsen, Fregattenkapitän Otto Feldmann

2nd Leader of Destroyers
Kommodore P. Heinrich, Admiralstabsoffizier Kapitänleutnant Meier
SMS Regensburg, Kommodore P. Heinrich, Fregattenkapitän Heuberer

Ist Flotilla, 1st Half Flotilla
Kapitänleutnant Conrad Albrecht (flag) on G39, G38, G39, G40, S32, V170, G197

Ist Flotilla, 2nd Half Flotilla
G192, G195, G196, G193

IIIrd Flotilla
S53, Kapitänleutnant Friedrich Götting hoisting Korvettenkapitän Hollman (flag)
IIIrd Flotilla, 5th Half Flotilla, V71, V73, G88, V74, V70

IIIrd Flotilla, 6th Half Flotilla
Kapitänleutnant Fröhlich, S54, V48, G42, G85, S55

Vth Flotilla
G11, Kapitänleutnant Adolf Müller hosting Korvettenkapitän Heinecke (flag)
Vth Flotilla, 9th Half Flotilla
Kapitänleutnant von Pohl, V2, V4, V6, V1, V3

Vth Flotilla, 10th Half Flotilla
G8, Oberleutnant zur See Rodenberg hosting KapitänleutnantFriedrich Klein, G7, V5, G9, G10, G8

VIIth Flotilla
S24 Kapitänleutnant Fink hoisting Korvettenkapitän von Koch (flag)
VIIth Flotilla, 13th Half Flotilla
Kapitänleutnant G. von Zitzewitz on S15, S15, S17, S20, S16, S18, S24

VIIth Flotilla, 14th Half Flotilla
Korvettenkapitän Hermann Cordes
S19, Oberleutnant zur See Reimer hoisting Korvettenkapitän Hermann Cordes, S19, S23, V189, V186

XIth Flotilla, 21st Half Flotilla
Kapitänleutnant G. von Bulow on S59, S59, S58, S57, G89, G90

XIth Flotilla, 22nd Half Flotilla
Korvettenkapitän H.Curnow, V75, V76, V77, V78
In all, it represented five battle-cruisers, 18 dreadnoughts, seven pre dreadnoughts, one armoured cruiser, 17 light cruisers and 81 torpedo boats, all of the High Seas Fleet's strength, 119 ships of war.
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0215 22 June 1916, British dispositions
0215 40 nautical miles Northeast of Rosyth, 22 June 1916

Beatty was at sea with three battle-cruiser and three light cruiser squadrons. Forewarned by Room 40 interceptions of German naval communication, his force followed Jellicoe's Grand Fleet. The Grand Fleet put to sea without incident. His own force had not been so lucky. For the last month, concerned by the possibility of U Boats lying in wait near fleet bases, particularly Rosyth, he had adopted an arrangement on Jellicoe's suggestion. This had been the sailing of the pre dreadnought HMS Albemarle up to 30 minutes ahead of his battlecruisers. As he prepared to leave on the previous day, Albemarle had taken two torpedoes from a German U Boat, itself sunk by ramming from an escorting destroyer. The old pre dreadnought had slowly settled, a fate that may have befallen some of his more modern ships. Beatty wondered if, unlike the warnings of the 31st May, the Germans would actually put to sea this time. He was eager to come to grips with them after the disappointments of the Battle of Dogger Bank. His was a substantial force, bolstered by the return of HMAS Australia from a refit. It consisted of:

Battle Cruiser Force, Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, Rosyth

1BCS
HMS Lion, flag, Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, VABCS, Captain A.E.M. Chatfield
HMS Princess Royal, flag, Rear Admiral O.de Brock, RA1BCS, Captain W.H. Cowan
HMS Queen Mary, Captain C.I. Prowse
HMS Tiger, Captain H.B. Pelly

2BCS
HMAS Australia, Capt. S.H. Radcliffe flag Rear Admiral W.C. Packenham, RA2BCS
HMS New Zealand, Captain H.Green
HMS Indefatigable, Captain C.A. Selby

3BCS
HMS Invincible, flag, Rear Admiral the Hon. H.A. Hood, RA3BCS, Captain A.L. Cay
HMS Inflexible, Captain EHF Heaton-Ellis
HMS Indomitable, Captain F.W. Kennedy

1LCS
HMS Galatea, flag, Commodore E.S. Alexander-Sinclair, Cmdre 1LCS
HMS Phaeton, Commander JE Cameron
HMS Inconstant, Capt. BS Thesiger
HMS Cordelia, Capt. TPH Beamish

2LCS
HMS Southampton, flag, Commodore W.E. Goodenough, Cmdre, 2LCS
HMS Birmingham, Captain A.A.M. Duff
HMS Nottingham, Captain C.B. Miller
HMS Dublin, Captain A.C. Scott

3LCS
HMS Falmouth, flag, Rear Admiral TDW. Napier, RA3LCS, Captain J.D. Edwards
HMS Yarmouth, Captain T.D. Pratt, (linking ship between light cruiser screen and VABCF)
HMS Birkenhead, Capt. E Reeves
HMS Gloucester, Capt. WF Blunt
HMS Chester, Captain R.N. Lawson

Seaplane carrier
HMS Engadine, Lt.Commander C.G. Robinson (4 Short Type 184 seaplanes)
HMS Riviera, Lt.Commander H.K Foulkes (4 Short Type 184 seaplanes)
HMS Onslow and HMS Moresby detached from 1DF to escort HMS Engadine

13 DF screening 1BCS:
HMS Champion, Captain J.U. Farie (D.13)

16 Admiralty M Class destroyers:
HMS Nestor, HMS Nomad, HMS Narborough, HMS Obdurate, HMS Petard, HMS Pelican, HMS Onslow, HMS Moresby, HMS Nicator, HMS Negro, HMS Nereus, HMS Paladin, HMS Pidgeon, HMS Penn, HMS Nepean, HMS Observer

10DF (part, detached from Harwich Force), screening 3BCS
2 Talisman Class destroyers, HMS Turbulent, TMS Termagant, 1 Yarrow M Class destroyer: HMS Nerissa, 2 Admiralty M Class destroyers Paladin, Penn

9DF (part, detached from Harwich Force), screening 2BCS
4 L Class destroyers
HMS Lydiard, HMS Liberty, HMS Landrail, HMS Laurel

In all, not counting the forces allocated to his scouting seaplane carrier, he had ten battle-cruisers, 13 light cruisers and 26 destroyers. This was backed by Jellicoe's massive Grand Fleet, consisting of:

Grand Fleet, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Scapa Flow

2BS, 1st Division, Cromarty
HMS King George V, flag, Sir Martyn Jerram, VA2BS
HMS Ajax, Capt. GH Baird
HMS Centurion, Capt. M Culme-Seymour
HMS Erin, Capt. VA Stanley

2BS, 2nd Division, Cromarty
HMS Monarch, flag Rear Admiral Arthur Leveson, RA2BS
HMS Conqueror, Capt. HHD Tothill
HMS Orion, Capt. O Backhouse
HMS Thunderer, Captain J.A. Ferguson

Attached 2BS: HMS Boadicea, Captain L.C.S. Woollcombe

4BS, 3rd Division, Scapa Flow
HMS Iron Duke, flag, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, CinCGF, Captain F.W. Dreyer
HMS Emperor of India, Capt. C.W.R. Royds
HMS Superb, flag Rear Admiral Duff, RA4BS, Capt. E Hyde-Parker
HMS Canada, Capt. WCM Nicholson

Attached Fleet Flagship: HMS Active, Captain P.Withers
Tender to HMS Iron Duke: HMS Oak, LtCdr. D Faviell (Destroyer Tender to the Flagship)
Marksman class destroyer-minelayer: HMS Abdiel, Commander Curtis

4BS, 4th Division, Scapa Flow
HMS Benbow, flag, Vice Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, VA4BS; Capt. HW Parker
HMS Bellerophon, Capt. EF Bruen
HMS Temeraire, Capt. EV Underhill
HMS Vanguard, Capt. JD Dick

Attached 4BS
HMS Blanche, Captain J.M. Casement
HMS Blonde, Commander J.E.A. Mocatta

1BS, 5th Division, Scapa Flow
HMS Colossus, flag, Rear Admiral E.F.A. Gaunt, RA1BS, Captain A.D.P.R. Pound
HMS Collingwood, Capt. JC Ley
HMS Neptune, Capt. VHG Bernard
HMS St. Vincent, Captain W.W. Fisher
HMS Hercules, Captain Clinton-Baker

1BS, 6th Division,
HMS Marlborough, flag Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, VA1BS, Captain G.P. Ross
HMS Revenge, Capt. ES Kiddle
HMS Royal Sovereign, Capt. A.T. Hunt
HMS Royal Oak, Capt. C. MacLachlan
HMS Agincourt
, Capt. HM Doughty

5BS Scapa Flow
13th Subdivision:
HMS Barham, flag, Rear Admiral Hugh Evans-Thomas, RA5BS, Captain A.W.C. Waller
HMS Valiant, Captain M. Woollcombe
14th Subdivision:
HMS Warspite, Captain E. Phillpotts
HMS Malaya, Captain the Hon. A.D.E.H. Boyle
HMS Queen Elizabeth, Capt. G.P.W. Hope

1DF, screening 5BS
HMS Fearless, Captain C.D. Roper, Captain (D.1)
I Class destroyers:
HMS Acheron, HMS Ariel, HMS Attack, HMS Hydra, HMS Badger, HMS Goshawk, HMS Defender, HMS Lizard, HMS Lapwing, HMS Botha, HMS Jackal, HMS Phoenix, HMS Archer, HMS Tigress

Attached 1BS: HMS Bellona, Captain A.B.S. Dutton

1CS, Cromarty
HMS Defence, flag Rear Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., RA1CS, Captain S.V. Ellis
HMS Warrior, Captain V.B. Molteno
HMS Duke of Edinburgh, Captain H. Blackett
HMS Black Prince, Captain T.P. Bonham

2CS, Scapa Flow
HMS Minotaur, flag, Rear Admiral H.L. Heath, RA2CS, Captain C.S.H. D’Aeth
HMS Hampshire, Capt. HJ Savill
HMS Cochrane, Capt. E la T Leatham
HMS Shannon, Capt. JS Dumaresq
HMS Achilles, Capt. F.M. Leake
HMS Donegal, Capt. W.H. D'Oyly

4LCS, Scapa Flow
HMS Calliope, flag, Commodore C.E. le Mesurier, Cmdre, 4LCS
HMS Constance, Capt. CS Townsend
HMS Comus, Capt. AG Hotham
HMS Caroline, Captain HR Crooke
HMS Royalist, Capt. H Meade
HMS Cambrian, Capt AH Read

4DF, Scapa Flow
Destroyer leaders: HMS Tipperary, flag, Captain C.J. Wintour (D.4)
HMS Broke, Commander AL Wilson

1 Admiralty M Class
HMS Ophelia
, Commander LGE Crabbe (escorting 3BCS)
16 K Class destroyers
HMS Achates, HMS Porpoise, HMS Spitfire, HMS Unity, HMS Garland, HMS Ambuscade, HMS Ardent, HMS Fortune, HMS Sparrowhawk, HMS Contest,
HMS Shark, HMS Acasta, HMS Christopher, HMS Owl, HMS Hardy, HMS Midge, HMS Cockatrice, HMS Victor, HMS Paragon


11DF, Scapa Flow
HMS Castor, Commodore J.R.P. Hawksley, Commodore (F)

Destroyer leader: HMS Kempenfelt, Commander HE Sullivan

13 Admiralty M Class destroyers
HMS Ossory, HMS Mystic, HMS Magic, HMS Mandate, HMS Minion, HMS Martial, HMS Milbrook, HMS Marne, HMS Manners, HMS Michael, HMS Mons, HMS Marmion, HMS Musketeer

3 Yarrow M Class destroyers: HMS Morning Star, HMS Mounsey, HMS Moonvin

12DF, Scapa Flow
Destroyer leaders: HMS Faulknor, Captain A.J.B. Stirling, D.12
HMS Marksman, Cdr. NA Sullivan (Flag, 2nd Half Flotilla)

16 Admiralty M Class destroyers
HMS Obedient, HMS Maenad, HMS Opal, HMS Mary Rose, HMS Marvel, HMS Menace, HMS Nessus, HMS Narwhal, HMS Mindful, HMS Onslaught, HMS Munster, HMS Nonsuch, HMS Nobel, HMS Mischief, HMS Napier, HMS Mameluke

Seaplane carrier (Scapa Flow): HMS Campania, Captain O. Schwann, 10 aircraft

In all, 31 dreadnoughts, 10 armoured cruisers, 10 light cruisers and 73 destroyers. Also in support was the Harwich Force of 5 light cruisers and 29 destroyers, consisting of:
5LCS
HMS Carysfoot, flag, Commodore R. Tyrwhitt
HMS Arethusa, Captain TP Hutchinson
HMS Cleopatra, Captain GH West
HMS Conquest, Captain EE Withers
HMS Penelope, Captain T Amos
HMS Canterbury, Captain P.M.R. Royds

9th DF
1 destroyer leader (Marksman class)
HMS Lightfoot, Captain T. Leverson-Gower

17 L Class destroyers:
HMS Lark, HMS Laverock, HMS Linnet, HMS Laertes, HMS Laforey, HMS Lance, HMS Lawford, HMS Legion, HMS Lennox, HMS Leonidas, HMS Llewellyn, HMS Lookout, HMS Loyal, HMS Lucifer, HMS Lysander, HMS Lassoo, HMS Lochinar

1 destroyer leader
HMS Nimrod, Captain HW Gardam

10 Admiralty M class destroyers
HMS Manly, HMS Mansfield, HMS Matchless, HMS Mentor, HMS Meteor, HMS Milne, HMS Minos, HMS Miranda, HMS Murray, HMS Myngs

Finally, based at Sheerness was the Nore Force, consisting of 1 dreadnought, 7 pre dreadnoughts, 3 armoured cruiser and 11 destroyers consisting of, Nore Command. Based at Sheerness, but actually lying in the Swin, the Northern passage of the Thames estuary:

3BS
HMS Dreadnought, flag, Admiral Sir George Callaghan
HMS Hibernia, HMS Zealandia, HMS Africa, HMS Britannia, HMS Commonwealth, HMS Dominion, HMS Hindustan

3CS
HMS Antrim, HMS Devonshire, HMS Roxburgh

6DF
Leader HMS Swift
10 Tribal Class destroyers
HMS Afridi, HMS Cossack, HMS Gurkha, HMS Mohawk, HMS Tartar, HMS Crusader, HMS Saracen, HMS Nubian, HMS Viking, HMS Zulu

9CS
HMS Swiftsure, HMS King Alfred
 
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0316 22 June 1916, Hood's thoughts on the Royal Navy
0316, North Sea, 22 June 1916

Sleep would not come for Rear Admiral Horace Hood. He had a number of concerns over the practices and composition of Beatty's battle-cruiser force, plus some over the Grand Fleet as a whole. In particular, for the battle-cruiser force, a lack of opportunity to practice gunnery, with no ranges available near their main base, Rosyth. For that reason alone, he took every opportunity available to avail his own command of such opportunities and his own ships had only returned to Rosyth from Scapa Flow after such a practice of the 14th.

His three ships of the Invincible Class were the weakest in Beatty's force. They mounted the same 8 12inch Mark X guns as their near sisters the Indefatigable Class, however, the amidships turrets of the Invincible Class ships were positioned too close together in the interests of saving weight and therefore speed. This did not allow them to fire across the deck, reducing the broadside to six guns only. The Invincible Class ships were poorly protected by a waterline belt of only 6 inches, only running from the rear X turret to just forward of A turret. Past A turret, the belt decreased to only 4 inches. The main battery guns and their supporting barbettes carried only 7 inches of armour and very little of her overall armour was below the waterline. It was quite apparent to Hood that his three ships were delicate beasts.

Nor was that the only concern. RN cordite charges were stored in pairs in metal containers in the magazines. The igniters in the charges were protected by a thick paper cover that was removed prior to loading. Hood had seen the crews regularly remove the paper caps in the magazines, as opposed to waiting until loading, which lead to a trail of propellant all the way from the gun turret to the magazine, a far from ideal practice and he had used his time at Scapa to strictly forbid such a practice, once he become aware of it. It had not, however, spread to the rest of Beatty's command. The Battle of Dogger Bank and its attendant disappointments were blamed on the slow rate of fire, yet Hood was of the opinion that lack of gunnery and signals practice were more to blame. Hood made closure of the magazine door, except when ammunition was passed through, mandatory. This was not enforced in other ships, again due to a manna for more speed of loading. Ammunition stockpiling outside the magazines was another dangerous practice that had become common, despite the almost loss of the cruiser Kent at Falkland Islands in 1914. It was officially banned by the Admiralty, but widely condoned, especially by Beatty.

Hood was unaware of other lurking problems, firstly, the very nature of the RN propellant charges themselves. They degraded faster than those of the High Seas Fleet and were therefore much more likely to explode spontaneously. Changes later in the war were to ameliorate these problems, but never completely solve them. Secondly, the quality of heavy shells was not all it should have been. Tests conducted as early as April 1914 showed that there were serious problems with RN armour piercing shells. This showed that the shells could not reliably penetrate heavy armour, even head on at closer ranges. At long ranges where the angle was 30 degrees or more, many shells disintegrated on even 6 inches of armour. Yet, nothing was done with these findings until much later. It was not until later in the war the new "greenboy" shells removed the defective lyddite bursters and shellite was added instead.

No, there were issues to be sure, but one thing the RN had on its side, Hood was sure, was tradition, training and the will to win. Losing was unthinkable. He had trained his own squadron to what he felt was its peak. In any case, weight of metal was always a decisive factor. There was a reason the big battalions always won. Beatty's force would consist of ten ships. If the High Seas Fleet's scouting force was to be encountered, they would have only half that number of ships. This time, unlike Dogger Bank, they would not escape.
 
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0320 22 June 1916, Hipper's thoughts on the High Seas Fleet
0320, 22 June 1916, North Sea

On board Lutzow, Hipper was also contemplating the potential weaknesses of his command. There was no question of fighting all of Beatty's force, if they were encountered. His own force, consisting as it did of only five ships, was too outnumbered for that. No, his task was to draw Beatty's ships towards Scheer, where they could be engaged, slowed and destroyed under the guns of the High Seas Fleet. The inclusion of Mauve's 2nd Battle squadron, with its seven slow pre dreadnoughts was, in his mind, scarcely an advantage. They would restrict the fleet to 16 knots, however, the decision as to their inclusion had not been his.

He would back his own ships against those of the British any day of the week, however, that was in a one-on-one fight. It was likely that they would not be fighting one on one and that some of his opponents would be shooting at him unmolested by return fire, an incentive for good gunnery. His ships were well armoured, the result of a different design philosophy than that of the RN. In the High Seas Fleet, the Scouting group was designed to return to the main body and then fight with it, against enemy dreadnoughts, as normal capital ships. Hence, their armour structure.

Of concern to Hipper was the relative lack of offensive power of his ships. The three oldest ships all used the 11-inch gun. These, both the L45 in the Von der Tann and the L50 in the latter two ships, all fired the 304kg AP shell. It was a reliable enough weapon, but lighter than the 385kg projectile of the RN 12-inch gunned ships and far less than the 635kg shells of two latest British ships, Tiger and Queen Mary. Only the Derfflinger and Lutzow used the 12-inch gun firing a 404kg projectile. The 13.5-inch guns of the latest British ships gave them greater range and would give them the advantage of firing first. On the flip side, as the range decreased, his own ships 11inch guns would need to close to 13,000 yards or less to penetrate the better armoured RN ships, such as Tiger.

Although Hipper's ships were better armoured, they were not immune to damage. One concern was, that in order to save weight and therefore generate speed, the torpedo bulkheads in all ships did not run the entire length of the hull. This left them with almost no armour at the furthest forward and furthest astern compartments, a feature that may yet prove of concern.

His final concern was for his light forces. His light cruisers were smaller than their RN contemporaries and armed with 4.1 inch, rather than the 6-inch guns of their opponents. His torpedo boats were similar, smaller and less well armed than their RN contemporaries. Even their torpedoes were inferior. The 50cm G7 torpedo that was standard mounted a 195kg warhead and had a maximum range at "slow" speed(27kts) of 9300m. It was less than the RN 21inch MK IV, which had a larger 235kg warhead and was capable of a range of 13,500 yards at 25 knots.
 
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1515 22 June 1916, empty seas
1515 22 June 1916, Skagerrak, North Sea, 250 nautical miles from Rosyth

The day had been uneventful so far for Beatty's squadron, with no trace of the German High Seas Fleet to be found. The strength of the wind had only just started to abate had precluded aerial reconnaissance. He had gone directly East for 230nm, then turning North-East and now commenced a run back to the North-West, back towards Jellicoe's Grand Fleet, now only 48 nautical miles to the North and coming South. Beatty was not to know that he had actually proceeded far enough East that he had inadvertently split the gap between the two German Fleets, passing exactly between the two German forces led by Hipper and Scheer, placing his own battle-cruisers to the East of both, an invidious position to be in.

Likewise Scheer was blissfully unaware that Beatty was, in fact, South East of his force and now steaming back to the North-West. Whilst this seemed to on the surface to have trapped the British force, the complication was he was steaming North-northwest, directly into the face of Jellicoe, now only 32 nautical miles to the North. Both battlecruiser forces were in a tight spot, although both remained unaware until 1515, when Rear Admiral Napier's 3LCS, dispatched to investigate reports of smoke to the North-West, ran into Konteradmiral Boedicker's IInd Scouting Group. This was the impetus for both Hipper and Beatty's heavy forces to investigate and battle to commence.
 
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1518 22 June, the wobbly eight
1518 22 June 1916, 20 nautical miles Southeast of Lowestoft

It was a poor command for George Callaghan. He had done so much to ready the Grand Fleet for a war and when it had finally come, he had been removed from command of the Grand Fleet and shuffled to the Nore Command. The main function was to ensure security of the Channel, however, with reports that the Germans may be readying a sortie, he led HMS Dreadnought and his seven remaining members of the "wobbly eight" to sea, taking HMS Swiftsure, normally deployed with the 9th Cruiser Squadron, with him. He had no desire to meet the main body of the High Seas Fleet with his eclectic collection of ships, most now only good for 18 or so knots. However, he could and would not let enemy forces break out into the English Channel and threaten both shipping and bombardment forces located there.

If, however, the Germans dispatched a light raiding force into the Channel he would be ready. With 12 heavy ships, even if eight were pre dreadnoughts and three armoured cruisers, he could quickly dispatch anything that was not the main German body. In truth Callaghan wanted action, to prove both to others and himself that he could have successfully helmed the Grand Fleet as well as any other man. As it was, he would establish a patrol line between Lowestoft and The Hague, blocking any entry to the Channel.
HMS Hindustan
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1519 22 June 1916, enemy in sight
1519 22 June 1916, Skagerrak, North Sea, 250 nautical miles from Rosyth

It had been a routine investigation of the old tugboat, converted to a steam trawler and operated under the Danish flag. 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron under Rear Admiral Napier only noticed the three low slung destroyers when they moved within 6,000 yards of the huffing old tug. Rapidly, he ordered full steam rung up. Aboard HMS Gloucester, he settled into his position on the bridge. "Sparks, this is important enough to break silence. Tell the flagship we have made a sighting of enemy forces."

"Sir." The greyhound unleashed on his flagship; the engines throbbed to the sound of gongs as the cruiser heeled heavily to port. There was a boom and then a shudder. Their quarry commenced zig zagging to avoid their shells. The German destroyer's speed was good, but then so was theirs.

The lookout shouted "Torpedoes, starboard quarter! The long steel projectile passed harmlessly by. There were flashes, distant rolling noise, a salvo from her smaller opponent. Small waterspouts rose from the sea, short. The Germans were game, or mad. Gloucester had fired twelve salvos as her and her sisters closed the range on the three smaller German ships. Finally, a different flash of red from the German. The destroyer's mast and part of her bridge were wreathed in smoke. Within three minutes four shells had penetrated her vitals, the ill-fated ship a mass of flame. Then the lookout shouted down again. "Four larger enemy ships, cruisers.....to starboard, fast movers!" The battle was about to be joined in earnest.
 
1523 22 June 1916, hold on a minute, aren't they going the wrong way?
1523 22 June 1916, Skagerrak, North Sea, 250 nautical miles from Rosyth

Friedrich Boedecker’s IInd Scouting Group consisted of the most modern light cruisers in the High Seas Fleet, at least until the new Konigsberg Class became available later in 1916. They were the only light cruisers in the fleet that carried the 5.9-inch gun, all previous ships carrying the now inferior 4.1-inch weapon. He rapidly moved his ships to engage the British cruisers, even though he was outnumbered 4 to 5. At the same time, he signalled Hipper, indicating that Royal Navy light units had been contacted. He needed to relieve the fleeing torpedo boats, one of which was already sinking and at the same time bring Hipper’s battle-cruisers, some ten miles to the North, back down on the British cruisers, which were already cut off from their bases.

Could they lure out the British battle-cruisers, if indeed they were not already at sea? Hipper had responded to Boedecker’s summons at 1525, initiating a battle turn that moved his fleet from a North-northwest course back onto a course of South southeast to come to his cruisers squadron’s aid. It was just as well he had done so as converging on his position was Jellicoe and the main body of the Grand Fleet, only 27 nautical miles away from his position when the turn was initiated. It was a curious situation, Beatty’s forces cut off by Hipper and potentially Scheers, Hipper to the North and West, Scheer the North and East. Bearing down on all of this was Jellicoe, steering South southeast at 19.7 knots, his flag in the Iron Duke.

A running battle over the next five minutes saw HMS Yarmouth hit three times by Pillau, Birkenhead and Falmouth once each by Frankfurt and Elbing. In return, Wiesbaden was hit twice by Falmouth and twice by Chester, starting fires aboard the new cruiser.

Aboard HMS Chester, Captain Rodney Lawson cheered as another hit from his ships 5.5-inch battery impacted on the last German cruiser in line. Rear Admiral Napier had the squadron running back North northwest in chase of the German ships. That was all very good in his own mind, but why would the six remaining German ships be “fleeing” in that direction, back towards Britain and directly away from their bases? Had that been considered?
HMS Chester
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looking like a nice read - I'm just wondering what the PoD is?
Two ships grounding in May and fouling their condensers results the operation being delayed four weeks, resulting in some extra units being available on both sides, the weather being slightly better in regards viability and the days themselves being longer by some 20 minutes or so.
 
1528 22 June 1916, enemy heavy ships
1528 22 June 1916, Skagerrak, North Sea, 240 nautical miles from Rosyth

Beatty had worked his battlecruisers up to 24.5 knots as they attempted to turn due North and "cut the corner on the fleeing German light cruisers that were being pursued by Napier's light cruisers. It was speed that presented no problem for the four large, sleek and modern ships of 1BCS. At the rear of his formation laboured the three I Class ships of Horace Hoods 3rd BCS, newly returned from Scapa, where they had changed places with Evan-Thomas 5th Battle Squadron. For all that, the ships were faster than Evans-Thomas Queen Elizabeth Class ships.

The contact report came rapidly. "Masts.....came the report from the lookout, one, no two...sorry four, no five, also general haze, bearing 330 degrees, range...possibly 12 miles as a calculation." Beatty now had a choice to make. Could this be the German battle-cruisers? Why else would the German light cruisers flee North, if not towards supporting forces? It made sense and from his own intelligence reports, 5-6 ships would make the right amount of numbers. If Hipper's battle-cruisers were out, what about the High Seas Fleet? His musings were broken by another report from his signals officer. Napier had broken radio silence to report himself under fire from "five enemy capital ships". It was enough information for Beatty. Signalling Jellicoe his intentions, he ordered an intercept course for the German heavy ships and ordered action stations. Jellicoe was some 30 nautical miles to the North northeast. Yet where was the High Seas Fleet, if indeed they were at sea?
 
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1531 22 June 1916, lets have a look whats out there
1531 22 June 1916, North Sea, 240 miles from Rosyth

HMS Riviera had actually been leading Beatty's battle-cruisers force, along with her fellow seaplane carrier HMS Engadine, the requirement for calm water to launch their aircraft the main reason for the placement in the van, where the wakes of Beatty battle-cruisers would not affect the launch of their Short Type 184 seaplanes. However, with the nearness of the German light cruisers, the two ships had rapidly come to a full stop, allowing Beatty's capital ships to move ahead of the 1,600 ton seaplane carriers. Harold Foulkes crew were frantically working on hoisting her aircraft over the side and prepare it for launch, a process that took at least 20 minutes in calm seas, likely longer in the light chop. He looked over at Engadine; at least his own ship was in the lead in preparing the seaplane for launch and take off. Beatty ordered Engadine to make a search to the South-southeast, Riviera to the North-northeast. Yet, all this would take time.
 
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