Japan seriously contemplated joining in on the invasion of the USSR in summer 1941. In OTL, they obviously didn't - Nomonhan had demonstrated the Soviet Army's clear advantage, and Siberia & the Soviet Far East wouldn't solve Japan's resource problems. But, assuming that they did decide to 'strike north' (perhaps Zhukov isn't in command and the clashes at Nomonhan are more like those at Chasan Lake, if on a larger scale?) attacking the USSR in June or July of 1941, what would the diplomatic consequences be? How do Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and the USA react? When, if ever, would Japan have to deal with the Western Allies?
'Strike North' question
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Jeremy Lin
Banned
This scenerio had no chance of success, the Russian winter would have bottled up and crippled the Japanese even worst than Hitler. Plus the Siberian Army 1 million strong would have been able to stay in base and exact a punshing replay of the Battle of Khalkihin Gol.
I agree that the Japanese would fail, badly - horrendous IJA logistics do not go well with the idea of fighting a major land war in Mongolia and Siberia, for starters. I'm more curious about the aftermath, and about what happens in China.
At what point would the Western Allies launch offensives against Japan, and how? On the other side, what forces could the IJA spare against them, and what would the IJN be doing?
At what point would the Western Allies launch offensives against Japan, and how? On the other side, what forces could the IJA spare against them, and what would the IJN be doing?
Jeremy Lin
Banned
Japan already had fully half of it's operational army and most of it's navy and air force in China, what more could it possibly spare in a two front war?
Japan would've used the Kwantung Army based in Manchuria to invade the USSR; historically, they also spared about 11 divisions, and most of the Navy, in 1941-1942, for operations against the Western Allies.
Japan wasn't exactly blessed with good strategic thought. In discussions in June 1941, the Japanese cabinet was seriously debating "do we strike North, then South" or "do we strike South, then North," as if both could be done.
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The Red -
Thanks! For some reason, I forgot the exact sequence of when Indochina was occupied. Definitely doable.
Biggest issue is the IJN's actions, though it should obviously be noted that the IJN of June/July 1941 was not the IJN of December 1941.
Japan wasn't exactly blessed with good strategic thought. In discussions in June 1941, the Japanese cabinet was seriously debating "do we strike North, then South" or "do we strike South, then North," as if both could be done.
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The Red -
Thanks! For some reason, I forgot the exact sequence of when Indochina was occupied. Definitely doable.
Biggest issue is the IJN's actions, though it should obviously be noted that the IJN of June/July 1941 was not the IJN of December 1941.
Would people agree that, given that any Japanese invasion of the USSR would be doomed to failure, the USSR would end the war in a stronger position in the Far East? Their short war with Japan in 1945 still managed to put them in control of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and North Korea at the end of the Second World War; in a longer conflict, how much could the Soviets conceivably be occupying by the end of the war? Presumably an entirely Soviet Korea, but would they be able to launch an invasion of the Home Islands at all?
Personally, I doubt that the USSR would conduct an invasion - I suspect that the Soviets would still be fighting the Germans around the same time they've pushed the Japanese out of Korea. I suppose it's not impossible, depending on the status of the IJN around this point, but it would be a tough prospect.
There'd be interesting consequences in Southeast Asia, I'd imagine.
There'd be interesting consequences in Southeast Asia, I'd imagine.
Jeremy Lin
Banned
To what strategic purposes invading Eastern Russia? more snow to make igloos out of? Given the unbelievable costs to sustaining such an endeavor the benefits are minimal at best.
Presumably to prevent the USSR from supporting the KMT (and knock it out as a potential enemy), and to support Japan's allies in the Axis - especially given the assumption that the USSR was a 'rotten structure' likely to collapse (less believed than in Germany, but Japan was open to the possibility - and if Nomonhan doesn't go so badly for Japan, they might be more likely to assume this).
It was not well thought-out, but Japanese strategic planning was never especially sound.
May need the divergence to be further back, to have the more stridently anti-Communist IJA officers (e.g. Sadao Araki) end up dominant.
It was not well thought-out, but Japanese strategic planning was never especially sound.
May need the divergence to be further back, to have the more stridently anti-Communist IJA officers (e.g. Sadao Araki) end up dominant.
A strike North would seem to be a pretty reasonable decision if Japan, Italy and Germany's interests were a proper alliance, rather than one merely of convenience. Like say in a game of Axis and Allies - where both players on the Axis side will play that way because if they don't, they lose. In real life Japan and Germany are unlikely to have a deep and meaningful strategic or tactical relationship
Even in that scenario the Japanese would be of greater benefit to the 'Axis' superstate if they went south.
Maybe, but then with a dead USSR, the superstate is in a very good bargaining position.
Undoubtedly, if there any chance of a 'Go North' strategy actually realising this...
Japan cannot achieve much. Even assuming that they begin their offensive in June or July (implying they're in on Barbarossa from the start), even if they achieve complete success and then some... there's nothing particularly vital in the Far East, nor any way to really get far enough inland to matter. America probably couldn't support a sustained offensive along a single railway line; Japan, with a far worse logistics system, would have an even harder time driving down the Trans-Siberian Railway towards anything truly important.
A successful 'Strike North' would cut off the Alaska/Petropavlovsk route for Lend-Lease... but that certainly wasn't the only route for Lend-Lease. Still, it is a factor.
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Japan can't spare much for fighting Britain, though the same is true for the British. The Japanese still have to consider the USN as a threat, and may be forced to operate from Hainan (depending on how quickly British forces seize French Indochina); in any event, their fleet isn't as good in June or July as it was in December. Shokaku and Zuikaku didn't commission until August and September; the A5M Claude, rather than the A6M Zero, is the dominant naval fighter.
A successful 'Strike North' would cut off the Alaska/Petropavlovsk route for Lend-Lease... but that certainly wasn't the only route for Lend-Lease. Still, it is a factor.
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Japan can't spare much for fighting Britain, though the same is true for the British. The Japanese still have to consider the USN as a threat, and may be forced to operate from Hainan (depending on how quickly British forces seize French Indochina); in any event, their fleet isn't as good in June or July as it was in December. Shokaku and Zuikaku didn't commission until August and September; the A5M Claude, rather than the A6M Zero, is the dominant naval fighter.
After some thought, and looking at this old thread...
Japan's going to run painfully low on fuel after, say, six months of sustained campaigning in the Soviet Far East. The only way to fix that is going to have to be to strike south, to take the Dutch oilfields, but Japan probably can't spare as much troops (and certainly not as much fuel) as in December 1941 in OTL, and Britain's already probably building up for a war. So, what can Japan do? Perhaps a smaller offensive than OTL, but what can they cut out? They have to reduce the Philippines and Malaya as threats, and to seize the Dutch oilfields; their options are limited.
Given the fuel issues, and the earlier British buildup in the Pacific (in preparation for when Britain would be ready to declare war on Japan in support of its Soviet ally, as the UK did against Finland), I could see Japan doing worse than OTL. So, what if by 1943, Japan is probably out of fuel, has been pushed out of the USSR, has had only limited success in the southwest Pacific? In OTL, they had had rather more successes, and would manage further successes against China - look at the Ichi-Go offensives in 1944; here, they're doing much worse. Could Japan sue for peace, perhaps even try to switch sides?
Offhand, I'd say yes, looking at Italy as an analog, but I'm curious what the rest of AH.com thinks... and what the implications for the postwar fate of Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, Indochina, the DEI, and the Philippines might be of an 'abbreviated' Pacific war. Some vague thoughts on these lines:
Japan - how much less does the political system get reformed than in OTL? What happens to the Mandates, assuming that US Navy forces have only been nibbling at them, rather than driving all the way to Iwo Jima? How is Japanese culture affected by no atomic bombs?
Taiwan - simply put, what happens to Taiwan?
Korea - Soviet puppet? If so, how does it turn out, and how will the Kims' relationship with the USSR be affected by not having the capitalist neighbor to the south? No Korean War, certainly, but what else?
Manchuria - depends on the overall fate of China, of course.
Indochina - assuming that it's on the frontlines in 1941-1942, how is it governed in 1943-1945... and after the war? With a shorter guerrilla war against Japan, will the Viet Minh be weakened? Alternatively, might they be brought into the power structure of postwar Indochina?
Dutch East Indies - It's possible that only part of the DEI ends up taken by the Japanese, leaving less supplies for Indonesian guerrillas after the war. Moreover, the shorter war should generally have a different impact on the DEI, and an even more different impact if freed-up KNIL forces end up being used elsewhere.
Philippines - A shorter, or even nonexistent, guerrilla war would have an immediate impact on the Huk rebellions of the postwar period, and long-term impacts on Filipino politics (given that different people would rise to prominence). On the other hand, Manila not being destroyed would have an impact of its own, possibly accelerating Filipino growth even faster than OTL.
Japan's going to run painfully low on fuel after, say, six months of sustained campaigning in the Soviet Far East. The only way to fix that is going to have to be to strike south, to take the Dutch oilfields, but Japan probably can't spare as much troops (and certainly not as much fuel) as in December 1941 in OTL, and Britain's already probably building up for a war. So, what can Japan do? Perhaps a smaller offensive than OTL, but what can they cut out? They have to reduce the Philippines and Malaya as threats, and to seize the Dutch oilfields; their options are limited.
Given the fuel issues, and the earlier British buildup in the Pacific (in preparation for when Britain would be ready to declare war on Japan in support of its Soviet ally, as the UK did against Finland), I could see Japan doing worse than OTL. So, what if by 1943, Japan is probably out of fuel, has been pushed out of the USSR, has had only limited success in the southwest Pacific? In OTL, they had had rather more successes, and would manage further successes against China - look at the Ichi-Go offensives in 1944; here, they're doing much worse. Could Japan sue for peace, perhaps even try to switch sides?
Offhand, I'd say yes, looking at Italy as an analog, but I'm curious what the rest of AH.com thinks... and what the implications for the postwar fate of Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, Indochina, the DEI, and the Philippines might be of an 'abbreviated' Pacific war. Some vague thoughts on these lines:
Japan - how much less does the political system get reformed than in OTL? What happens to the Mandates, assuming that US Navy forces have only been nibbling at them, rather than driving all the way to Iwo Jima? How is Japanese culture affected by no atomic bombs?
Taiwan - simply put, what happens to Taiwan?
Korea - Soviet puppet? If so, how does it turn out, and how will the Kims' relationship with the USSR be affected by not having the capitalist neighbor to the south? No Korean War, certainly, but what else?
Manchuria - depends on the overall fate of China, of course.
Indochina - assuming that it's on the frontlines in 1941-1942, how is it governed in 1943-1945... and after the war? With a shorter guerrilla war against Japan, will the Viet Minh be weakened? Alternatively, might they be brought into the power structure of postwar Indochina?
Dutch East Indies - It's possible that only part of the DEI ends up taken by the Japanese, leaving less supplies for Indonesian guerrillas after the war. Moreover, the shorter war should generally have a different impact on the DEI, and an even more different impact if freed-up KNIL forces end up being used elsewhere.
Philippines - A shorter, or even nonexistent, guerrilla war would have an immediate impact on the Huk rebellions of the postwar period, and long-term impacts on Filipino politics (given that different people would rise to prominence). On the other hand, Manila not being destroyed would have an impact of its own, possibly accelerating Filipino growth even faster than OTL.
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I really can't improve very much on my 2010 post, so I'll just copy/paste it here:
If Japan attacked the USSR in June of 1940
1) Warned by Sorge spy ring, Soviet forces are waiting for Japanese attack. Kwantung Army suffers series of utterly crushing defeats at hands of Far East Front.
2) Japanese Army runs its strategic oil reserve dry in December of 1940. Despite protests from naval quarters military government orders IJN to share its stocks with Army.
3) Forced to share its stores with Army, IJN runs out of strategic reserves in early July 1941.
4) In desperate effort to save itself Japan attacks to the south on September 5, 1941. Unfortunately, due to a lack of available personnel the attacks are far more limited in scope than IOTL and concentrate on Borneo and DEI. Despite some initial success the Japanese are unable to exploit their early gains as the U.S. & UK declare war zones surrounding their colonial possessions in the Pacific that restrict the movement of all combatant nation's shipping. As DEI has little shipping in region of war zones, war zones are effectively a blockade in all but name against Japan.
5) Unable to continue without DEI fuel, the IJN attempts a surprise attack against American air bases on Luzon, Mindanao, Guam & Wake and British colony of Hong Kong on October 22, 1941 in hope of altering strategic situation long enough to withdraw from USSR and reclaim initiative in China.
Attacks fail with exceptions of strike at Clark Field which succeeds in destruction of 17 B-17 bombers and 12 P-36 fighters and at Hong Kong, where defenders are overrun after five days of vicious fighting.
6) Douglas MacArthur is relieved of command of American forces in Philippines following debacle at Clark Field and is returned to retired list. MacArthur remain in the Islands as primary military adviser to Philippine president.
7. United States and United Kingdom declare on Japan on October 26, 1941. Finding himself without option but to support his Axis partner, Hitler instructs that Germany declare war on the United States of America.
If Japan attacked the USSR in June of 1940
1) Warned by Sorge spy ring, Soviet forces are waiting for Japanese attack. Kwantung Army suffers series of utterly crushing defeats at hands of Far East Front.
2) Japanese Army runs its strategic oil reserve dry in December of 1940. Despite protests from naval quarters military government orders IJN to share its stocks with Army.
3) Forced to share its stores with Army, IJN runs out of strategic reserves in early July 1941.
4) In desperate effort to save itself Japan attacks to the south on September 5, 1941. Unfortunately, due to a lack of available personnel the attacks are far more limited in scope than IOTL and concentrate on Borneo and DEI. Despite some initial success the Japanese are unable to exploit their early gains as the U.S. & UK declare war zones surrounding their colonial possessions in the Pacific that restrict the movement of all combatant nation's shipping. As DEI has little shipping in region of war zones, war zones are effectively a blockade in all but name against Japan.
5) Unable to continue without DEI fuel, the IJN attempts a surprise attack against American air bases on Luzon, Mindanao, Guam & Wake and British colony of Hong Kong on October 22, 1941 in hope of altering strategic situation long enough to withdraw from USSR and reclaim initiative in China.
Attacks fail with exceptions of strike at Clark Field which succeeds in destruction of 17 B-17 bombers and 12 P-36 fighters and at Hong Kong, where defenders are overrun after five days of vicious fighting.
6) Douglas MacArthur is relieved of command of American forces in Philippines following debacle at Clark Field and is returned to retired list. MacArthur remain in the Islands as primary military adviser to Philippine president.
7. United States and United Kingdom declare on Japan on October 26, 1941. Finding himself without option but to support his Axis partner, Hitler instructs that Germany declare war on the United States of America.
Technically, here they're attacking in July 1941, not June 1940 (impossible - Japan wouldn't attack alone, especially with M-R still in place!), though I'd argue a similar timeline for fuel shortages (given the oil embargo imposed since the occupation of Indochina); I might also arrange for Sorge to be captured earlier than OTL. given that he ran very big risks already. Same problems, though. Best-case, the IJA manages to take Vladivostok (after a prolonged siege), but gets nowhere close to its ultimate goal of Irkutsk, and gets thrown out of the Soviet Far East in 1942.
I don't see the IJA managing to steal the IJN's fuel; instead, the IJN, arguing that the British are already Soviet allies and the Americans nearly so, goes for a modified 'Strike South.' No Pearl Harbor strikes, given tightened fuel needs.
Personally, I don't see Britain not declaring war on Japan in support of the DEI - if Japan's pushing to Borneo, Japan would have to cover its flanks; further, the Dutch government-in-exile is an important member of the Allies, being among the strongest governments-in-exile. Then again, I don't think Japan can afford to just attack Borneo, to leave Malaya and Manila as threats (though, to be fair, in your scenario, they pretty much have to, since they don't have the fuel to do much else). With the 'reasonable' start date of summer 1941, Japan has access to bases in Indochina for its fall 'strike south;' I could see the Japanese scrounging up some of the eleven divisions it historically committed, but not enough to do everything. Perhaps Japan coerces Thailand into supporting a limited offensive in Malaya while conducting air attacks against American bases in the Philippines? SNLF promises it can take Wake & Guam?
Obvious anti-Dugout Dougism to have MacArthur be relieved for fucking up to a smaller extent than on December 7 in OTL, but I don't mind.
Personally, I suspect that HK's possibly been evacuated, given that Britain's preparing to enter the war with Japan in support of the USSR anyway.
Incidentally, I suspect that Japanese troops will be surrendering much more often than in OTL; their morale is going to generally be lower, propaganda is going to be less effective, etc. In OTL, Soviet troops took over 600k prisoners in August 1945.
By early 1943, we're looking at Japan being in a similar state to Italy - her best armies destroyed in Russia and in the colonies, her navy damaged, her homeland under threat of Allied invasion. I wouldn't be shocked if Japan does what Italy did.
I don't see the IJA managing to steal the IJN's fuel; instead, the IJN, arguing that the British are already Soviet allies and the Americans nearly so, goes for a modified 'Strike South.' No Pearl Harbor strikes, given tightened fuel needs.
Personally, I don't see Britain not declaring war on Japan in support of the DEI - if Japan's pushing to Borneo, Japan would have to cover its flanks; further, the Dutch government-in-exile is an important member of the Allies, being among the strongest governments-in-exile. Then again, I don't think Japan can afford to just attack Borneo, to leave Malaya and Manila as threats (though, to be fair, in your scenario, they pretty much have to, since they don't have the fuel to do much else). With the 'reasonable' start date of summer 1941, Japan has access to bases in Indochina for its fall 'strike south;' I could see the Japanese scrounging up some of the eleven divisions it historically committed, but not enough to do everything. Perhaps Japan coerces Thailand into supporting a limited offensive in Malaya while conducting air attacks against American bases in the Philippines? SNLF promises it can take Wake & Guam?
Obvious anti-Dugout Dougism to have MacArthur be relieved for fucking up to a smaller extent than on December 7 in OTL, but I don't mind.
Personally, I suspect that HK's possibly been evacuated, given that Britain's preparing to enter the war with Japan in support of the USSR anyway.
Incidentally, I suspect that Japanese troops will be surrendering much more often than in OTL; their morale is going to generally be lower, propaganda is going to be less effective, etc. In OTL, Soviet troops took over 600k prisoners in August 1945.
By early 1943, we're looking at Japan being in a similar state to Italy - her best armies destroyed in Russia and in the colonies, her navy damaged, her homeland under threat of Allied invasion. I wouldn't be shocked if Japan does what Italy did.
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