If Hart was to receive orders from the CNO or higher directing him to start doing patrols, both air, ship, and sub, there would not be much Mac could do about it because of where it originates from someone higher than him. Course in Douglas's mind you would think that even God was below him at times.
Hart only received direct orders to patrol East to the mandates, cooperate with the Dutch aerial recon to the South and to Indochina, in particular Cam Ranh Bay. Washington assumed (wrongly) that Hart and Mac Arthur were both cooperating and had aircraft flying recon over Formosa, and Hart had subs doing close inshore patrols there.
 
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It would be bad to learn after the fact that stocks of AA ammo and replacement aircraft engines were bombed in harbor warehouses, but shipments of winter hats and gardening tools were moved to safety in advance.
Hear, Hear. The missuses will be devastated to not have their bonnets straight from London for the Winter Proms. And however will the gentlemen get along without rakes for
the traps on the golf courses.?!?

I understand that Malaya Command has some recent experience in modern warfare. Do the troops or civil population have that experience as well? We're about to find out...
 
Australians identified as "Australians" from about 1850 onwards. Monash was of German Jewish descent. If he thought of himself as anything other than Australian, it was as a Jewish man of Australian descent. You cannot claim him as "British" without a quote/reference where he stated he was "British". Tsk, tsk, tsk... :eek:
:eek:
Perfidious Albionese ex-pat perhaps? :)
 
MWI 41113016 Black Hawk

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Sunday 30 November;

The rattling of the chains told of the anchor’s release, and dive to the bottom of Balikpapan Bay, as the US Navy destroyer tender Black Hawk slowed to a halt, her journey from Manila complete. Normally once she had finished dragging her anchor, and settled, bow facing the current, she would drop the stern anchor and secured herself. But this wasn’t normal, the destroyers accompanying her wouldn’t be tying up alongside either, they would anchor separately, some distance away from each other.

Their visit here in the Dutch East Indies, was to refuel, but Capt H V Wiley, commander of Destroyer Squadron 29, onboard the tender, had orders from Adm Hart to "have difficulty in refuelling", with a view toward lingering in those ports "for a protracted period if necessary." In short, stay as long as you could, keeping out of harm’s way from the half expected Japanese assault on the Philippines. The visit had been discussed with the Dutch, who were more than happy to oblige. And so here, along with Black Hawk was Destroyer Division 57, four Clemson class destroyers, USS Alden, USS JD Edwards, USS Whipple and USS Edsall.

The Clemson class were a modified Wickes class, given greater endurance by adding wing tanks, and a second 3-in AA gun. The class had been completed just after WWI, and were the last flush deck destroyers built. Just over a year ago, a number of them had been included in the 50 destroyers given to Britain as part of the ‘Destroyers for Bases’ Agreement. The Royal Navy, recognising they were no longer suitable for fleet destroyer action, had converted them into ocean escorts, stripping a lot of their armament to make the ships more seaworthy, and make room for depth charge racks. Indeed, the US Navy recognised that, and others had been converted to high-speed transports (APH), high-speed minesweepers (DMS), destroyer minelayers (DM) and seaplane tenders (AVD). However, here in the Asiatic Fleet, they were still employed as fleet destroyers, and were comparable to the dozen or so British and Australian destroyers operating in these waters. Nevertheless, in a one-on-one matchup with the Japanese destroyers of the Fubuki class or later, they were a distant second.

A day earlier, 300 odd miles to the North, at Tarakan Island, still 800 miles south-west of Manila, the Omaha class light cruiser USS Marblehead, along with another four Clemson class destroyers, USS Paul Jones, USS Barker, USS Parrott and USS Stewart had dropped anchor, under the command of Marblehead’s CO Capt Robinson, with exactly the same orders. The Omaha class were of the same vintage as the destroyers, but were far more capable than the smaller C and D class light cruisers of the Royal Navy to be found employed in these waters. Most other significant USN surface ships of the Asiatic Fleet were also being sent to southern Philippine port locations as part of Adm Hart’s contingency plans.

The whole thing had come about from a ‘war warning’ Admiral stark had issued to both the CinC’s of the Pacific and Atlantic fleets, as well as Hart on the 27th November. Negotiations with the Japanese had failed, and an aggressive move by the Japanese was expected in the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops, together with the deployment of Naval task forces suggested an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula in southern Thailand or Borneo. He was to execute appropriate defensive deployments preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5. The war department was issuing a similar warning, and Douglas would no doubt have that, while their allies, the British, had also been warned.

Douglas didn’t seem to be taking it seriously, but Hart was under no illusion as to what would happen to his surface fleet if the Japanese attacked, and to preserve what he had, he was moving them, as best he could, out of harm’s way, in case the storm broke over the Philippines.
 
1941, Sunday 30 November;

The rattling of the chains told of the anchor’s release, and dive to the bottom of Balikpapan Bay, as the US Navy destroyer tender Black Hawk slowed to a halt, her journey from Manila complete. Normally once she had finished dragging her anchor, and settled, bow facing the current, she would drop the stern anchor and secured herself. But this wasn’t normal, the destroyers accompanying her wouldn’t be tying up alongside either, they would anchor separately, some distance away from each other.

Their visit here in the Dutch East Indies, was to refuel, but Capt H V Wiley, commander of Destroyer Squadron 29, onboard the tender, had orders from Adm Hart to "have difficulty in refuelling", with a view toward lingering in those ports "for a protracted period if necessary." In short, stay as long as you could, keeping out of harm’s way from the half expected Japanese assault on the Philippines. The visit had been discussed with the Dutch, who were more than happy to oblige. And so here, along with Black Hawk was Destroyer Division 57, four Clemson class destroyers, USS Alden, USS JD Edwards, USS Whipple and USS Edsall.

The Clemson class were a modified Wickes class, given greater endurance by adding wing tanks, and a second 3-in AA gun. The class had been completed just after WWI, and were the last flush deck destroyers built. Just over a year ago, a number of them had been included in the 50 destroyers given to Britain as part of the ‘Destroyers for Bases’ Agreement. The Royal Navy, recognising they were no longer suitable for fleet destroyer action, had converted them into ocean escorts, stripping a lot of their armament to make the ships more seaworthy, and make room for depth charge racks. Indeed, the US Navy recognised that, and others had been converted to high-speed transports (APH), high-speed minesweepers (DMS), destroyer minelayers (DM) and seaplane tenders (AVD). However, here in the Asiatic Fleet, they were still employed as fleet destroyers, and were comparable to the dozen or so British and Australian destroyers operating in these waters. Nevertheless, in a one-on-one matchup with the Japanese destroyers of the Fubuki class or later, they were a distant second.

A day earlier, 300 odd miles to the North, at Tarakan Island, still 800 miles south-west of Manila, the Omaha class light cruiser USS Marblehead, along with another four Clemson class destroyers, USS Paul Jones, USS Barker, USS Parrott and USS Stewart had dropped anchor, under the command of Marblehead’s CO Capt Robinson, with exactly the same orders. The Omaha class were of the same vintage as the destroyers, but were far more capable than the smaller C and D class light cruisers of the Royal Navy to be found employed in these waters. Most other significant USN surface ships of the Asiatic Fleet were also being sent to southern Philippine port locations as part of Adm Hart’s contingency plans.

The whole thing had come about from a ‘war warning’ Admiral stark had issued to both the CinC’s of the Pacific and Atlantic fleets, as well as Hart on the 27th November. Negotiations with the Japanese had failed, and an aggressive move by the Japanese was expected in the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops, together with the deployment of Naval task forces suggested an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula in southern Thailand or Borneo. He was to execute appropriate defensive deployments preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5. The war department was issuing a similar warning, and Douglas would no doubt have that, while their allies, the British, had also been warned.

Douglas didn’t seem to be taking it seriously, but Hart was under no illusion as to what would happen to his surface fleet if the Japanese attacked, and to preserve what he had, he was moving them, as best he could, out of harm’s way, in case the storm broke over the Philippines.
How is this different (if at all) to OTL?
 
British imperial identity is always a complicated issue and I think the best way to answer will be to make sure understand what the question is trying to determine.

Freyberg is an interesting one. Born in England and a British soldier before (just) WW1, leading British (home) units during the latter parts of the War. So would be fair to call him a British general. On the other hand he very much is a New Zealander - grew up in NZ and went to Wellington College (which for you non Kiwis is one of the many Late Colonial founded State (government) High Schools that despite being government owned quickly became a place for the elite to send their children). So anyone going to a school like that very much is going to identify with NZ and the establishment regardless of what they go on to do whilst also being fairly described as a British or NZ General.


I went to a similar such place although now it is much reduced circumstances, WBHS, but it also was in the early 20th century basically NZ's most imperialist school. Loads of people like my father who went there post WW2 felt very British because of that and quite a few of them ended up in the UK.
 
How is this different (if at all) to OTL?
This is spot on. The Sub Tenders and 1 oiler were still in Manila, or at Cavite, filling their holds and workshops with supplies and parts. 2 destroyers and 2 submarines were at Cavite undergoing repairs, as well as 24 submarines, preparing for war patrols, from Cavite and the tender Canopus. OTL USS Houston ceased any further upgrades, she now had an AA suite of 8 x 1 x 5"/25 cal dp guns 2 x 1x 3"/50 cal dp , and 4 x4 x1.1" AAA " Chicago Pianos. Left behind, uninstalled, was 1 x 4 x1.1" AAA and a set of SC radar.
 
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Hi Cryhavoc and Kelgar04, this is all as was historical, but most helpful in framing whats happening in the theatre for those who don't know.
If anyone has ever played the PC game War in the Pacific Admiral's Edition this is the starting position for these forces. As an aside a mighty game that represents each day of the war as a single turn and contains an extreme amount of detail - and thats before you starting heading into modified scenarios which add extra chrome!
 
1941, Sunday 30 November;

The rattling of the chains told of the anchor’s release, and dive to the bottom of Balikpapan Bay, as the US Navy destroyer tender Black Hawk slowed to a halt, her journey from Manila complete. Normally once she had finished dragging her anchor, and settled, bow facing the current, she would drop the stern anchor and secured herself. But this wasn’t normal, the destroyers accompanying her wouldn’t be tying up alongside either, they would anchor separately, some distance away from each other.

Their visit here in the Dutch East Indies, was to refuel, but Capt H V Wiley, commander of Destroyer Squadron 29, onboard the tender, had orders from Adm Hart to "have difficulty in refuelling", with a view toward lingering in those ports "for a protracted period if necessary." In short, stay as long as you could, keeping out of harm’s way from the half expected Japanese assault on the Philippines. The visit had been discussed with the Dutch, who were more than happy to oblige. And so here, along with Black Hawk was Destroyer Division 57, four Clemson class destroyers, USS Alden, USS JD Edwards, USS Whipple and USS Edsall.

The Clemson class were a modified Wickes class, given greater endurance by adding wing tanks, and a second 3-in AA gun. The class had been completed just after WWI, and were the last flush deck destroyers built. Just over a year ago, a number of them had been included in the 50 destroyers given to Britain as part of the ‘Destroyers for Bases’ Agreement. The Royal Navy, recognising they were no longer suitable for fleet destroyer action, had converted them into ocean escorts, stripping a lot of their armament to make the ships more seaworthy, and make room for depth charge racks. Indeed, the US Navy recognised that, and others had been converted to high-speed transports (APH), high-speed minesweepers (DMS), destroyer minelayers (DM) and seaplane tenders (AVD). However, here in the Asiatic Fleet, they were still employed as fleet destroyers, and were comparable to the dozen or so British and Australian destroyers operating in these waters. Nevertheless, in a one-on-one matchup with the Japanese destroyers of the Fubuki class or later, they were a distant second.

A day earlier, 300 odd miles to the North, at Tarakan Island, still 800 miles south-west of Manila, the Omaha class light cruiser USS Marblehead, along with another four Clemson class destroyers, USS Paul Jones, USS Barker, USS Parrott and USS Stewart had dropped anchor, under the command of Marblehead’s CO Capt Robinson, with exactly the same orders. The Omaha class were of the same vintage as the destroyers, but were far more capable than the smaller C and D class light cruisers of the Royal Navy to be found employed in these waters. Most other significant USN surface ships of the Asiatic Fleet were also being sent to southern Philippine port locations as part of Adm Hart’s contingency plans.

The whole thing had come about from a ‘war warning’ Admiral stark had issued to both the CinC’s of the Pacific and Atlantic fleets, as well as Hart on the 27th November. Negotiations with the Japanese had failed, and an aggressive move by the Japanese was expected in the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops, together with the deployment of Naval task forces suggested an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, the Kra Peninsula in southern Thailand or Borneo. He was to execute appropriate defensive deployments preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5. The war department was issuing a similar warning, and Douglas would no doubt have that, while their allies, the British, had also been warned.

Douglas didn’t seem to be taking it seriously, but Hart was under no illusion as to what would happen to his surface fleet if the Japanese attacked, and to preserve what he had, he was moving them, as best he could, out of harm’s way, in case the storm broke over the Philippines.
Also OTL, transport carrying HQ and HQ Company and 1st Battalion 4th Marines arrives at Manila, from Shanghai, then moves to Olonpongo(Subic Bay) Naval station, off loads and moves into the Barracks there, Olopongo Separate Marine Battalion, less the 5 AAA batteries, becomes 3rd Battalion 4th Marines.
 
and

Hi Cryhavoc and Kelgar04, this is all as was historical, but most helpful in framing whats happening in the theatre for those who don't know.
Makes sense within the context of things going on. Still thinks are really starting to get a mite uncomfortable.

Also MacArthur still burying his head in the sand.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
Off the two senior military commanders in the Philippines, one Admiral Hart was fully aware of the situation and the possibilities that a Japanese attack held for his force. While the other General MacArthur seamed to be away with the fairies, and basically failing to take seriously the threat posed by the Japanese. Hart has ITTL tried as far as the political establishment in Washington and his own high command allowed, to prepare his command for war. Including attempts to coordinate with the Dutch and British naval commands, despite the restrictions imposed upon him. He shouldn’t have to give his fleet commanders secret orders to linger in Dutch waters, without telling the Dutch authorities what is going on. In an ideal scenario, not only would he have been able to establish an agreed communications protocol between the Americans, British and Dutch, to avoid as far as possible misunderstandings. Their should have been established small secure land based communications networks, between the ports and Manila, so that the fleets could go radio dark, but retain contact with high command. An office ashore manned by a few officers and signals specialists, able to communicate ship to shore by flag and light, with a work boat to carry longer signals out to the ships, plus linked into the commercial cable network to transmit signals to Manila. You can bet that the majority of communications between the British in Singapore and the Dutch in Batavia, were by cable, and that by now ITTL, both the British and the Dutch have an office in Singapore and Batavia to receive such a cable, decode it and pass it on to the relevant department. The level of cooperation between the British and Dutch ITTL, which is more than happened IOTL, bodes well for response to the imminent Japanese assault, were as the lack of coordination between the Americans and the Anglo Dutch, means there is going to be significant confusion between them at first.

RR.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
How much will the Confusion screw over the Anglo-Dutch particularly if MacArthur sticks his bloody oar in?

My personal opinion is very little, Hart will once the conflict has started, despite the confusion will quickly fall into line with his British and Dutch counterparts. MacArthur however is going to be mostly ignored by his counterparts, he has had little to no contact with the Dutch, and Gort has already formed a very poor opinion of him. Not only has Gort met Mac, and come away with a serious headache, plus a desperate desire for a stiff drink. And Park who was with him, likewise wasn’t impressed by Mac, or his staff, and is not going to take any notice of advice from him or his staff.

RR.
 

Driftless

Donor
No matter what, Mac Arthur blamed the USN for abandoning him!

Wasn't that the built in weak spot of all the East Asian War Plans?

The USN viewed the Philippines as near indefensible against a determined Japanese attack going back to the Span-Am War. The bulk of the US fleets were always going to be near US continental waters and the significant Japanese fleet was in their own back lagoon, so odds were decidedly against the USN. The USN plan was always to step away/retreat til sufficiently heavy reinforcements arrived from the US to oust the Japanese. Meanwhile, the US Army was to hold off the Japanese long enough for those reinforcements to arrive. The Army was not ever keen on that idea, understandably.

The disasters at Pearl Harbor and the cocked up moves from Manila to Bataan shattered all those theoretical timelines.

Douglas would have been aware of that plan theories, either by formal brief, or general conversations with his brother Arthur (before he passed away).
 
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The problem with all the cables is they are controlled or under the supervision of someone in Mac's inner circle. They might not be able to know what is in it, but they will be curious why all those top secret encrypted cables are going to Hart bypassing him. If Hart wanted to have secure comms with his fleet then he would use the RTTY units on ship and shore that he controlled to send messages back and forth over the radio. One of the problems with the messages before Pearl Harbor was the fact the Army had problems with their radio transmitters in DC, but the Navy didn't or they used other transmitters to send their messages instead of commercial cables. One of the problems with the signal corps was their rivalry with the Navy and the fact that they tended to forget at times the ways the Navy had experimented with other means because you couldn't just fall back to using the cable to a ship at sea.
 
My personal opinion is very little, Hart will once the conflict has started, despite the confusion will quickly fall into line with his British and Dutch counterparts.

RR.
Why of course the USN will fall in line with the Dutch and British war plans. It's actually what was achieved by the British and the Dutch with RADM Doorman anyways.

Just as the Americans must fall in line with Hajji Ali and the British Govts. plans in 1812 for them. Or, the Treaty of Versailles where Britain and France give the Marshall Islands to Japan. And of course, The League of Nations Caroline Islands and No. Marianas Chain Mandate to Japan. The European Colonialists are stuck with an ally unworthy of their awesomely wonderful European Masters of Statecraft.

If only CAPT Chichester had sailed off at Manila. The PI could have been a German and then a Japanese issue. No ADM Hart. No GEN MacArthur. Perhaps no Pearl Harbor, Tarawa or Peleliu. And here we Americans go and ruin it for EVERYONE!!!
 
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