6 August 1941. Singapore.
The arrival of WS9AX the previous day had brought with it the 11th Bn RTR and their 58 A12 Infantry Tanks Mark II. The Battalion had been raised in January 1941 and there had been talk of them training on some kind of secret new weapon. Instead, they had been designated to join the forces reinforcing Malaya and Singapore.
Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival had been somewhat surprised when informed that the War Cabinet had included a Tank Battalion among the reinforcements he was to receive. Some of his staff had doubts about the suitability of the tanks in the terrain, but Percival couldn’t help feeling that he shouldn’t look a gift horse in the mouth. Lt-Col Michael Hedderwick (CO 11th Bn RTR) was formerly introduced to his new Commanding Officer, who was full of questions about the capabilities and limitations of a Tank Battalion.
Lt-Col Hedderwick had been promoted and transferred from 7th Bn RTR, where he’d commanded a squadron of A12s in the battle of Arras (loaned to 4th Bn RTR on the day). Bringing that experience to Malaya Command was going to be a challenge. Hedderwick and his officers had spent long hours on the voyage looking at as much information as they could get their hands on. The questions about the suitability of the ground for tanks would only be fully answered once they were in country and had a chance to reconnoitre the area.
When he had the chance, Hedderwick asked Percival to allow him to do three things in the first month. Firstly, to have a number of his officers and NCOs to make a thorough study of the landscape, particularly after they’d seen the general plan to defend Malaya and Singapore. Secondly, it would take up to a month to make sure that all the tanks were fighting fit. The question of tropicalisation was something of a mystery regarding the Matilda IIs. There would likely be a need for some trial and error to get the tanks, and their crews adapted for the climate and geography. The need for his men to have some kind of rudimentary training in jungle warfare, even it was just to learn which snakes were most dangerous, would be much appreciated.
The third and final request was to keep the Battalion together. What had been learned in the war so far was that splitting tank forces up into penny packets was counter-productive. It had been shown in North Africa that the combination of Infantry Tanks and the Indian and Australian Infantry was very successful. Once everything was organised, Hedderwick’s Adjutant had prepared a training program to offer to the Infantry units on collaboration between tanks, infantry and artillery.
Percival’s Chief of Staff was furious that a Lieutenant-Colonel should have the gall to tell his superior what he wanted. It was up to Malaya Command to find something useful to do with these tanks, and there were plenty of senior officers who had requested some tanks for each of their particular needs. Percival however had read Hedderwick’s file, and knew that he had fought as a young officer at Cambrai in 1917 and again as a Major at Arras in 1940. Percival never had much to do with tanks at any point in his career. His inclination was the same as his Chief-of-Staff, to provide as many units as possible with a troop of tanks. Hedderwick however had made a good case. Percival agreed the first two requests without hesitation. Everyone coming to Malaya needed time to adapt, and tanks were an unknown capability in the country. As to the last request, Percival could see that providing his main infantry Brigades with training on collaborating with tanks would be worthwhile. As to keeping the Battalion together, he couldn’t promise anything, until he had a better notion of just what tanks would be able to do.
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